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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

LIZA VICTORIA CORWELL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20020343-CA

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted tampering with evidence in violation
of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-8-510 and 76-4-101 (1999), a third degree felony, in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 782a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether this Court should consider a claim of error which defendant did not timely
appeal under rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and which error defendant invited?
An appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal as ofrightwhen defendant's notice
of appeal is untimely and defendant failed to file a Rule 4(e) motion to extend. State v.
Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App. 1989).

2. Whether the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress e\ idence
found during a warrantless search when detectives, responding to a tip that defendant and her
companion were involved in illegal drug activity, saw defendant's companion conceal what
appeared to be a crack pipe and saw both occupants engaging in other suspicious behavior0
Factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Galvan, 2001 UT App 329, <|5, 37
P.3d 1197 (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the trial court's conclusions of
law based on these facts are reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. McArthur, 2000
UT App 23,112,996 P.2d 555 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851,854-55 (Utah 1992)).
3. Whether this Court should consider defendant's claim that the trial court failed to
comply with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting her guilty plea, a
claim of error which defendant invited?
An appellate court will decline to consider a claim of error invited by the moving
parties affirmative action. State v. Chaney, 1999, UT App 309, ^[54, 989 P.2d 1091.
If the Court should review defendant's claim, whether the trial court strictly complied
with rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in accepting defendant's guilty plea?
Whether the trial court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law, reviewed
for correctness. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60,1fl0, 983 P.2d 556.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION. STATUTES, AND RULE
The following constitutional provision, statutes, and rule are relevant to the
disposition of this case, are attached at Addendum A:

2

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-8(1999);
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Liza Corwell and her codefendant, Rebecca Champneys, were charged
with tampering with evidence, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-8-510 (1999), unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), and unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5
(1999) (R. 2-5).
Before trial, both defendant and Ms. Champneys moved to suppress evidence obtained
during a search of their persons and motel room (R. 49-50). Following a joint hearing, the
trial court denied the motions (R. 47-48,66; 99:24-26).l Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty
to attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony, reserving her right to appeal the
trial court's denial of her motion to suppress (R. 53, 56-62, 68; 100:2, 4, 14). The court
sentenced defendant to a statutory term, not to exceed five years in prison, but suspended the
sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 72-74).

1

Ms. Champneys appeal, raising the same issue as defendant at Point I, is pending
before the Court. See State v. Champneys, No. 20020123-CA.
3

Within thirty da>s after the entry of judgment, defendant filed a notice of appeal and
moved to w ithdraw her guilty plea (R. 75, 84; 182:2-6).: The trial court revoked defendant's
probation for failure to comply with the terms of her probation, but then reinstated probation
upon its original terms (R. 142-43). Upon defendant's motion, this Court stayed the appeal
and temporarily remanded the case until the trial court ruled on defendant's motion to
withdraw her guilty plea (R. 154, 158, 160-62). The trial court denied the motion and this
appeal ensued (R. 164, 176; 182:5-6).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3
The Search and Seizure
On March 13, 2001, Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy Ita of the Salt Lake City
Police Department investigated a report that defendant and a Rebecca Champneys might be
"using and/or selling narcotics" at a motel (R. 99:2-3, 9, 63).4 The informant specifically

2

The caption and jurisdictional statement of defendant's opening brief states that
her appeal is from convictions of attempted tampering with evidence and attempted
forgery. Aplt. Br at cover and 1. However, as the plea colloquy makes clear, it was Ms.
Champneys, and not defendant, who pleaded guilty to attempted forgery (R. 100:12-14).
3

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings from the
suppression hearing. State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994). The transcript of
the hearing (R. 99:1-29) is attached at Addendum B.
4

The trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress was based largely on Detective
Anderson's testimony at the suppression hearing (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, "Ruling," R. 63-65, attached at Addendum C). However, it was also based on the
codefendant Champneys' and the State's memoranda and Detective Anderson's testimony
at the preliminary hearing, a copy of which was attached to defendant Champneys'
memorandum in support of her motion to suppress (R. 39-46, 63; 99:1; State v.
Champneys, No. 20020123-CA, "Champneys;' R. 26-38, 39-56). The transcript of the
preliminary hearing has been supplemented to the record in this case, is cited as
"Champneys, R. _," and is attached at Addendum D. At the preliminary hearing,
4

directed the detectives to room number 236 at the Motel 6, located at 1990 West North
Temple Street in Salt Lake City (R. 99:2-3).5
Based on this information, the detectives went to the motel room and knocked on the
door - "a knock and talk" (R. 99:3). Detective Ita identified himself as "Tracy" and, after
Ms. Champneys expressed some confusion, Ita responded that he was 'Tracy with the Salt
Lake City Police Department'1 (R. 99:4). Also, in response to Ms. Champney's request.
Detective Ita displayed his badge through the peep hole in the door, and Detective Anderson
displayed his badge through an adjoining window (R. 99:4). Detective Anderson testified
that there was a "six to twelve" inch gap between the curtain and the door through which he
could see into the room (R. 99:4). When the officers asked Ms. Champneys if defendant was
also in the room, Ms. Champneys responded negatively (R. 99:5). However, after Anderson
observed another woman in the room, Ms. Champneys admitted to him that the other woman
was, in fact, defendant Lisa Corwell (R. 99:5).
After the detectives displayed their badges and asked to open the door, Ms.
Champneys unsuccessfully tried to close the gap in the curtains (R. 99:6). At the same

Detective Anderson asserted that the informant said that the occupants of a motel room,
defendant and Champneys, were involved with illegal drugs (Champneys, R. 40, 47-48).
5

The trial court treated the informant as "anonymous," although the evidence was
various on this point (R. 99:24). At the preliminary hearing, Detective Anderson stated
that information concerning defendant's illegal drug activity came from her husband
(Champneys, R. 48). Also, Ms. Champneys supporting memorandum asserts that the
detectives "knew nothing about the tip except the person stated he was [defendant's]
husband" (Champneys, R. 36). However, at the suppression hearing, Detective Anderson
stated that he did not recall if the informant had identified himself (R. 99:3, 9).
According to Detective Anderson, Detective Ita, who did not testify, received the
informant's call (R. 99:2).
5

instant, from about five to ten feet, Detective Anderson saw defendant put what he thought
was a crack pipe into a purse and then put it behind the bed (R. 99:4, 6-7, 15). Anderson
testified that he "initially thought it was a crack pipe. It was a metallic object that looked the
size and shape of a crack pipe" (R. 99:6). On cross examination, Anderson firmly asserted
several times that he "thought it was a crack pipe," consistent with his preliminary hearing
testimony (99:12; Champneys, R. 41,49-50). When Detective Anderson later searched the
purse, he found only a spoon (R. 99:12).
Detective Anderson then observed "a lot of movement in the room" - - "[both women]
running around the room . .. both [going] into the bathroom [at least three times each] . . .
putting stuff behind the bed . . . under the bed" (R. 99:4, 7). Defendant's and Ms.
Champneys' trips to the bathroom were significant to Detective Anderson because, in his
experience, people in hotels often try to flush narcotics down the toilet (R. 99:7).
The detectives repeatedly asked Ms. Champneys to open the door (R. 99:3, 6, 8).
Because she refused, Detective Ita obtained a key from the motel manager, who directed the
detectives to evict the women if they were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 99:7-8). Even
with the key the detectives were unable to enter the room because the women had engaged
the dead-bolt (R. 99:8). When Ms. Champneys repeatedly refused to open the door,
Detective Ita kicked it open (R. 99:8).
Once inside the room, Detective Anderson applied a twist lock to Ms. Champneys,
arrested her, and put her in flexible plastic handcuffs {Champneys, R. 43). Ms. Champneys
was placed in custody by other officers {Champneys, R. 43). In Ms. Champneys' right rear

6

pocket. Detective Anderson found a metallic pipe, which she admitted she used to smoke
cocaine (Champneys, R. 43). Ms. Champneys became extremely hostile, demanding to be
searched by a female officer (Champneys, R. 43). When Detective Anderson learned that
a female officer was en route to the scene, he stopped searching Ms. Champneys
(Champneys, R. 43).
When Officer Patty Roberts arrived, she searched both defendant and Champneys
(Champneys, R. 44, 47). On defendant, she found a rock of cocaine and drug paraphernalia
(Champneys, R. 53). On Champneys, Officer Roberts found a twist or baggie and a contact
case containing substances which tested positively for cocaine in her bra and Kleenex and
a burnt brillo pad in her pants (Champneys,R. 44).
While being searched in the bathroom, Champneys grabbed some of the cocaine from
the counter and tried to flush it down the drain (Champneys, R. 45). A brief struggled ensued
(Champneys, R. 45). When Officer Roberts asked defendant what had happened to the twist,
Champneys asserted that it had fallen down the drain, but Officer Roberts found it in
Champneys' hand (Champneys, R. 46).
The Plea-taking6
After the trial court denied defendant's suppression motion, defendant agreed to plead
guilty to a reduced charge of attempted tampering with evidence in exchange for the right
to preserve her appeal of the trial court's ruling and the dismissal of the remaining charges
(R. 53, 56-62, 68; 100:2-4,14).

6

The transcript of the plea-taking (R. 100:1-16) is attached at Addendum E.
7

On December 7,2001, the trial court conducted a joint change of plea hearing of both
defendant and Ms. Champneys (R. 100:1). Ms. Champneys' counsel, in both defendant's and
Ms. Champneys' presence, first informed the court that both defendants were going to plead
guilty to attempted tampering with evidence under State v. Sen\ "reserving their right to
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress" (R. 100:2). Thereafter, in both defendants'
presence, the trial court began the pleacolloquy by emphasizing that their right to appeal was
being conditionally preserved through a "Sery" plea: "[S]o everybody is clear on that, [it]
means you can appeal it" (R. 100:1, 4).7 Defendant's counsel acknowledged the court's
clarification: 'That's correct" (R. 100:4). The court then elicited from counsel that a change
of plea statement had been prepared for defendant, that counsel had reviewed the statement
with defendant, and that counsel believed defendant understood the statement (R. 100:4;
Statement of Defendant, R. 56-62, attached at Addendum F).
Addressing both defendant and Ms. Champneys, the court indicated that it would ask
each of them questions (R. 100:4). Thereafter, the court conducted a plea colloquy of both
defendants, alternating its questions to each defendant and receiving each defendant's answer
in turn (R. 100:4-15). The court first emphasized that it needed to be sure that defendant had
plenty of time to discuss the content of the plea statement with her attorney because she
would be surrendering rights in pleading guilty (R. 100:5). Defendant assured the court that
she had had plenty of time to review the statement with her attorney and that she believed

7

See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).
8

she understood the statement (R. 100:5). In response to the court's specific questions,
defendant acknowledged her understanding of the following:
• pleading guilty to a third degree felony potentially subjected her to a
maximum five-year sentence in the Utah State Prison and a fine as high
asS5,000(R. 100:5-6);
• the court had not yet made up its mind on defendant's sentence and would
decide the sentence only after reading the presentence report and hearing
what all counsel and she had to say (R. 100:6-7);
• in giving up the right to a trial, scheduled for the following Monday, she
important constitutional and statutory rights outlined in her statement
(R. 100:7);
• by pleading guilty, there would be no trial the following Monday (R. 100:7);
• she wanted to give up her right to a trial the following Monday (R. 100:7);
• if there was a trial she would have the right, thought she would not be
required, to testify and tell her story to a jury and that by not having a
trial she would not be able to testify (R. 100:7-8);
• by pleading guilty she would give up her right to confront her accusers,
witnesses that the State would call to prove her guilt of the charged
offense (R. 100:8);
• by pleading guilty her attorney would be unable to cross examine the
State's witnesses to test their credibility (R. 100:8);
• the court presumed she was innocent and that the court would require a
jury, if the case were tried, to presume similarly until and unless the
State proved her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:8-9);
• by pleading guilty she lost her right to the presumption of innocence
and that she wanted to give up that right (R. 100:9);
• by pleading guilty she gave up the opportunity to defend herself and
to require the State to meet the high standard of proving her guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:9-10);

9

• she was pleading guilty to attempted tampering with evidence, a third
degree felony, which she and Champnevs had committed on March 13,
2001, by attempting to alter, destroy or conceal evidence, believing
that an official investigation was going on (R. 100:10);
• on March 13, 2001, at 1990 West North Temple Street, she and
Champneys, after seeing police officers and communicating with
them verbally, attempted to conceal materials (R. 100:10);
• she believed she was guilty of the offense she was pleading guilty to
(R. 100:11).
The court then confirmed that defendant had not consumed alcoholic beverages in the
past twenty-four hours, was not under the influence of any drugs, and that she believed she
was thinking clearly (R. 100:11). The court also elicited from defendant that nothing in the
court's discussion was unclear and that she had no questions before she tendered her guilty
plea (R. 100:12). The trial court asked defense counsel, "[A]nything else either one of you
would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments?" (R. 100:12). Counsel for
Champneys said, "No" (R. 100:12). Counsel for defendant said, "I have nothing, Your
Honor" (R. 100:12). Following Champneys' plea-taking, the court accepted defendant's
guilty plea to attempted tampering with evidence, signed defendant's statement, and observ ed
that their appeared to be a factual basis for the plea (R. 100:13-14). The court then expressed
its belief that defendant understood the rights she was surrendering and the attendant
consequences and that defendant had entered her plea voluntarily (R. 100:14-15). Before
concluding the proceedings, the trial court informed defendant that she had the right to be
sentenced in not less than two days but not more than forty-five days (R. 100:15).

10

On April 2, 2002, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate five-year
term in the Utah State Prison, but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on probation
(R. 72-74). On April 26, defendant filed a notice of appeal (R. 75). On April 29, defendant
moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 84). Specifically, defendant claimed that she did not
understand the different ramifications between pleading guilty to a felony as opposed to a
misdemeanor (R. 120). She also alleged that her plea was involuntary because the trial court
had not conducted the plea colloquy in strict compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, by failing to advise her of (1) the right to a speedy public trial, (2) the
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, (3) that her right to appeal would be
limited by the entry of a guilty plea, and (4) the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw
the plea (R. 120-23; 182:2-6).
On June 5, 2002, defendant filed a motion and memorandum "to hold appeal in
abeyance and to stay the briefing schedule pending disposition of motion to withdraw guilty
plea" (R. 158-62). In her motion, defendant stated that if the trial court denied her motion
to withdraw her guilty plea she "plan[ned] to appeal the denial of the motion to this
Courf'and would then request that this Court consolidate her two appeals (R. 162). On June
20, this Court stayed the appeal and temporarily remanded the case until the trial court ruled
on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea ("Stay order," R. 154, attached at
Addendum G).
In granting the stay, this Court stated: "If the trial court denies the motion, Appellant
shall file an amended notice of appeal under the same appellate case number" (R. 154). The
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trial court denied the motion (R 164, 176, 182 5-6)

Defendant filed a supplemental

designation of record, supplemental certificate, and a supplemental request for transcript (R
167-72) No amended notice of appeal appears in the record.
The trial court heard defendant's motion to withdraw her plea on June 21, 2002 (R
164, 182.1). Defense counsel conceded at the outset that defendant's not understanding the
difference between felony and misdemeanor probation "doesn't seem like it's a basis for the
withdrawal of the plea," and the tnal court agreed (R. 182.3, 5). Counsel also acknowledged
that he had looked at the plea statement and that defendant had said she read and understood
it (R. 182:3). However, counsel asserted that defendant's motion was based on the tnal
court's failure to expressly mention four rule 11 nghts dunng the plea colloquy (R. 182.4)
Although counsel acknowledged that the colloquy could be properly supplemented by
reference to defendant's plea statement, he asserted that the statement failed to mention the
nght to speedy tnal (R. 182:4). The tnal court observed that the plea was taken on a Fnday
and that defendant had been informed that the tnal was set for the following Monday,
commenting, "Can't get much speedier than that" (R. 182.4-5). Defense counsel agreed with
the court's comment and acknowledged that the court had informed defendant of the
imminent tnal setting (R. 182:5). The court then found that defendant's rule 11 nghts had
been properly explained to her through the oral colloquy in conjunction with defendant's
statement (R. 182:5). The court also found that its omission dunng the colloquy of any nghts
referenced by defendant was harmless (R. 182:5). Specifically, the court noted that the plea
statement expressly informed defendant that a motion to withdraw her plea must be filed
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within thirty days of her sentencing and that the court's hearing the matter negated an> harm
(R. 182:5). Similarly, the court observed that its failure to inform defendant that it could
impose consecutive sentences was irrelevant since defendant had pleaded guilty to a single
offense (R. 182:5). The court then denied defendant's motion, concluding that defendant's
plea was made "knowingly and voluntarily" (R. 177-78 at 178; 182:5).8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant failed to appeal the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea, a necessary prerequisite for appeal under rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's appeal on this issue and
defendant's challenge to the trial court's denial of her motion must be dismissed.
POINT II
The trial court properly upheld a warrantless search of defendant's motel room
because the detectives performing the search had probable cause that defendant was involved
in illegal drug activity and exigent circumstances justified an immediate entry. In addition
to the reliability and content of the tip that directed the detectives to the motel room, probable
cause was established when one of the detectives observed defendant try to hide what
reasonably appeared to be a crack pipe, followed by defendant's and her companion's
apparent efforts to hide evidence and bar the detectives from entering.
8

The transcript of the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, R.
182:1-6, is attached at Addendum H. The trial court's order denying defendant's motion
to withdraw her plea and findings of fact and conclusions of law, R. 176-78, are attached
at Addendum I.
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Additionally, exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of the motel room
Defendant and her companion were engaging in behavior that led the officers to reasonablv
believe that evidence was being destroyed, precluding their obtaining a warrant in time to
preserve the evidence.
POINT HI
Defendant invited any error in the trial court's failing to strictly comply with the
requirements of rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant prepared and
submitted a plea statement, on which the trial court relied, that was deficient in those rule 11
requirements defendant claims the cour. committed plain error in omitting.

Because

defendant affirmatively led the trial court into any error, this Court should decline to consider
defendant's claim.
In any event, the trial court strictly complied with rule 11(e). Under State v Visser,
2000 UT 88, 22 P,3d 1242, a trial court strictly complies with rule 11 if a defendant's
experience communicates as much as an oral recitation of rights. Id. atf 13. Defendant was
made amply aware through the plea colloquy and her properly incorporated plea statement
that her right of appeal the denial of her motion to suppress was preserved, a right she plainly
exercised. Also, by clearly and repeatedly informing defendant that by pleading guilty she
was giving up her right to trial, scheduled for the following Monday, the trial court
effectively communicated to defendant her right to a speedy trial.
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ARGLMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT LACKS JLRISDICTION
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS ON APPEAL

TO

CONSIDER

Defendant filed a notice of appeal following the entry of a judgment of conviction
for attempted tampering with evidence, but failed to subsequently file an amended notice of
appeal from the final order of the trial court denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea
Defendant was on notice that rule 4 (b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, required that she
file a notice of appeal after the tnal court ruled on her motion That motion, as explained
below, was tantamount to a motion for a new tnal. Consequently, defendant's notice of
appeal was premature and of no effect. Therefore, this Court lacks junsdiction to consider
defendant's challenge to the tnal court's ruling.
Under rule 4, an appeal of right "shall be filed . . within 30 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a)

"If an appeal is not

timely filed, this court lacks junsdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato v Utah Transit Auth ,
2000 UT App 299,1J7, 13 P.3d 616; State v Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App 1989)
(appellate court lacks junsdiction to hear appeal as of nght when defendant's notice of appeal
is untimely and defendant failed to file a Rule 4(e) motion to extend) Because defendant's
claims on appeal lie outside the Court's junsdiction, the Court has authonty to only dismiss
the appeal Vanan-Eimac, Inc v Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App 1989).
A. The factual background.
After the tnal court denied her motion to suppress evidence obtained in an alleged
15

illegal search, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to attempted tampering with
e\ idence reserving her right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion (R
53,63-66,100 2) On April 2,2002, judgment was entered (R 72) On April 26, defendant
filed a timely notice of appeal to the judgment (R 75)
However, on April 29, defendant moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R 84) On June
5, 2002, defendant filed a motion and memorandum "to hold appeal in abeyance and to stay
the briefing schedule pending disposition of motion to withdraw guilty plea" (R 158-62)
In her motion, defendant stated that if the tnal court denied her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea she "plan[ned] to appeal the denial of the motion to this CourTand would then request
that this Court consolidate "her appeals from her conviction and the denial of her motion"
(R 162)
On June 20, this Court stayed the appeal and temporarily remanded the case until the
trial court ruled on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea (Stay Order, R 154,
attached at Addendum G). In granting the stay, this Court stated "If the tnal court denies
the motion, Appellant shall file an amended notice of appeal under the same appellate case
number" (R 154) On June 21, the tnal court denied the motion from the bench (R. 164,
Transcnpt of heanng, R. 182:5-6, attached at Addendum H). On September 10, defendant
filed a supplemental designation of record, a supplemental certificate, and a supplemental
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The tnal court signed a document entitled, "Minutes, Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment" ("Judgment") on March 29, 2002 (R. 68) However, a copy of that
document was not docketed until Apnl 2, 2002 (R 72) Because "entry" of judgment
requires both execution and docketing, see e g , Nelson v Stoker, 669 P 2d 390, 392-93
(Utah 1980), defendant's notice of appeal was timely as to the "March 29M judgment
16

request for transcript (R. 167-72). The final order denying the motion and findings o( fact
and conclusions of law, prepared at the trial court's direction, were not entered until October
11, 2002 (Order and Findings, R. 176-78, attached at Addendum I). No amended notice of
appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea appears in the
record.
B. A notice of appeal filed before a final order disposing of a post-judgment
motion is premature and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.
On facts similar to those in this case, the Utah Supreme Court in Swenson Assocs
Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994), found that failure to timely file a notice
of appeal following a post-judgment order deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction. In
Swenson, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss Swenson's complaint. Id. at
416. Before the final order of dismissal was entered, Swenson moved to amend the findings
of fact and for a new trial under rules 52(b) and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
respectively. Id. The trial court denied the motions and directed the State to prepare an
order. Id. Soon after, the final order of dismissal was entered and Swenson timely appealed
from that order. Id. However, when the order denying Swenson's motions to amend the
findings and for a new trial was later prepared and entered, Swenson failed to file a notice
of appeal from that order. Id.
The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Swenson's appeal under
rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. With respect to rules 52(b) and 59, and rule
24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (motion for a new trial), rule 4(b) provides:
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the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denv ing
a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion . . . . A notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured/ram the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion
as provided above. [Emphasis added.]
Utah R. App. P. 4(b). Citing this Court with approval, Swenson restated the rule relating to
premature filing of a notice of appeal of post-judgment motions:
[Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) ] requires a new notice of appeal to be
filed after entry of an order disposing of a post-judgment motion. Filing of a
post-judgment motion of the types listed in [rule 4(b) ] suspends the finality of
the judgment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to disposition of such a motion
by entry of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an appellate
court.
Swenson, 889 P.2d at 417 (quoting Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah
App. 1988) (per curiam) (brackets in original). See State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264,265 (Utah
1997) (applying rule 4(b) to conclude lack of appellate jurisdiction of ruling denying motion
for new trial under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure). Cf State v. Gardner, 2001
UT 41, ^|10, 23 P.3d 1043 (same result where notice of appeal filed, but no final order
denying motion for new trial found in record).
C. Rule 4(b) expressly identified a motion to withdraw a guilty plea as a
post-judgment motion requiring the filing of a timely notice of appeal.
Any argument that defendant was unaware that he should have filed another notice
of appeal is defeated by the express language of rule rule4 (b). On November 1, 2002,
twenty-one days after the trial court issued its order denying defendant's motion to withdraw
her guilty plea, amended rule 4 (b) became effective. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) amendment notes.
That current, amended rule states: "[I]f a timely motion is filed in the trial court... (2) to
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withdraw a plea under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, the time for appeal for all parties shall run
from the entry of the order . . . denying the motion to withdraw the plea ." Utah R. App. P.
4(b). Thus, defendant technically had express notice that she was required to file a second
notice of appeal within nine days of the rule's effective date. Even if the Court concluded
that such notice was insufficient, defendant should not be relieved of the rule's specialized
notice-of-appeal filing requirements on post-judgment motions.
Utah's appellate courts have regularly deemed various post-judgment motions to fall
within the express categories identified in rule 4(b). See Gardner, 2001 UT 41, at 117
(construing motion for reconsideration of pre-judgment motion to suppress a motion for new
trial) (citing Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, (Utah 1991) ('"exception to
order and motion for reconsideration' was properly treated as motion for new trial")). In
State v. Culley, this Court construed a post-judgment motion to declare a misplea as a motion
for a new trial under rule 4(b), summarily dismissing the appeal for lack ofjurisdiction. State
v. Culley, 2001 UT App 124 (per curiam) (unpublished opinion cited under Grand County
v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25 at 1fl[7, 16, 44 P.3d 734 (approving citation to useful unpublished
opinions that reflect well-established law)) (attached at Addendum J).10 In this case, the
10

There are policy reasons also for treating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
especially a post-judgment plea withdrawal motion, like a motion for a new trial. A
conviction following the entry of a guilty plea is the equivalent of an conviction following
a verdict. See State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248, 1249 (Utah 1977) (once a plea of guilty is
knowingly and voluntarily entered, there are no issues for trial and right to jury trial is
waived); State v. Stewartf\l\ P.2d 383, 385 (Utah 1946) (a plea of guilty amounts to a
"conviction"). Moreover, the reversal of a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea (followed by defendant's actually withdrawing his guilty plea) has the same
effect as a reversal of a conviction: defendant is subject to a new trial. State v. Maguire,
857P.2d598, 600. (Utah 1998).
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Court implicitly recognized that defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea was to be
treated as a post-judgment motion under rule 4(b) vv hen it expressly directed defendant to file
an amended notice of appeal if the trial court denied the motion (R. 154).
In this case, defendant committed the same procedural error as defendants in S\\ enson,
Anderson, and Jiminez - failure to file a notice of appeal to an order on a post-judgment
motion. That error is more egregious in light of (1) defendant's own acknowledgment that
at issue were separate appeals of the denial of her motion to suppress evidence and her postjudgment motion to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 162), and (2) this Court's express directiv e
to file an amended notice of appeal if the trial court denied her motion to withdraw her guilty
plea(R. 154).
In sum, because defendant failed to file a notice of appeal following the entry of the
trial court's order of October 11,2002, denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's challenge to the trial court's rulings denying
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her motion to suppress and to withdraw her guilty plea and her appeal must be dismissed.
In any event, defendant's claims are without merit.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND BY DETECTIVES
DURING A SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S MOTEL ROOM BECAUSE
THE SEARCH WAS SUPPORTED BY BOTH PROBABLE CAUSE
AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Defendant claims that the police violated her right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures because they lacked both probable cause and exigent circumstances to
search her hotel room. Br. Aplt. 15-21. Contrary to defendant's claim, the search conducted
by the detectives was supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence found as a result of that
search.
11

Even if this Court should, for some reason, construe defendant's first notice of
appeal to independently preserve her right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress,
it should readily find that it lacks jurisdiction to review the trial court's denial of her
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. As set out above, rule 4(b) expressly requires a
defendant to file a notice of appeal from a final judgment or order. By no stretch of the
imagination could defendant's post-sentence notice of appeal be considered timely as to
the trial court's order denying her motion to withdraw his guilty plea. That notice of
appeal was plainly never intended to perfect defendant's appeal from any prospective trial
court order at the time it was filed on April 26, 2001: that notice of appeal was filed three
days before defendant moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 75, 84), a month and a half
before she acknowledged to this court that she distinguished her appeal from the denial of
the motion to suppress (R. 162), almost two months before the trial court heard the matter
(R. 164), and five and a half months before the final order denying his motion issued (R.
176). Additionally, this Court specifically ordered defendant to file an amended notice of
appeal if the trial court denied her motion (R. 154). Notwithstanding this Court's express
directive, defendant evidently never filed a notice of appeal with respect to the trial
court's order denying her motion. Therefore, this Court should find, at the very least, that
it lacks jurisdiction to consider defendant's claim and dismiss the appeal as to that issue.
21

'"[Pjrobable cause alone is never enough to search . . . and seize without a warrant *'
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). "However, '[a] warrantless search of a
residence is constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent circumstances are
proven." State v. Yoder% 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted).
A.

The search was supported by probable cause that
defendant and her companion were engaged in illegal activity.

Probable cause exists where '"the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense is being
committed.'" State v. Comer, 2002 UT App 219, at^f 21,51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Dorsey\
731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986)) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in
original). 'The probable cause determination is based on the 'totality of the circumstances.'"
Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 (citing State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,1187 (Utah App. 1994)). The
appellate court reviews the trial court's underlying findings of fact for clear error; it reviews
the trial court's determination of probable cause for correctness, "giving the trial court a
measure of discretion 'to apply the standard to the particular set of facts in the case.'" Id.
(quoting Nguyen, at 1186).
/.
Based only on their observations of defendant's participation in patently
criminal conduct, the detectives had probable cause to search the motel room.
Defendant argues that the detectives lacked probable cause to enter and search the
premises, based on this Court's analytic framework in State v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah
App. 1997) (reasonable suspicion), and State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,37 P.3d 260,
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w hich applies that framework to the determination of probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 16-20. See
Mulcah\\ 943 P.2d at 235-36 (identifying three determinative factors for probable cause
when police are relying on an informant's tip: 1) the "type of tip or informant involved/' 2)
''whether the informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support
a stop," and 3) "whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's
report on the informants tip."). That framework, which places a premium on the "tip" which
initiates an official investigation, is inapposite to this case. Here, probable cause was not
based primarily on the tip, but rather on the detectives' observations of defendant's criminal
conduct from a lawful position outside the motel room.
In Valenzuela, this Court stated:
Here, because the State predicates its probable cause argument upon
information received from an informant, "we must examine the 'totality of the
circumstances' to determine whether the informant's tip, together with police
observations, provided probable cause to arrest" Valenzuela. [Emphasis
added.]
Id. at 1|11 (quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996) (quoting Gates v.
Illinois, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)))(emphasis added). "Predicate"
means "to affirm or base upon facts, arguments, conditions, etc." Webster's New World
Dictionary 1149 (Coll. ed. 1957). The record shows that probable cause was hardly based
on the tip.
Detectives Anderson and Ita proceeded to the Motel 6 based on a tip that defendant
and another woman, later determined to be Champneys, might be using and/or selling
narcotics (R. 99:2-3, 91). The trial court gave short shrift to the tip, discussing it in only the
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first of its thirteen findings of fact (bench ruling, 99:24-26; Ruling, R. 63-65, attached at
Addenda B and C). As such, the court implicitly recognized that the tip only initiated the
detectives' investigation. See State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977) (officer's
overhearing and viewing suspicious behavior relating to illegal drug use gave rise to duty to
investigate). See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235-36 (holding that police must corroborate
anonymous tip). The court specifically observed, "Had the officers not been able to see into
the room then of course they would not have had the right to enter the room. They couldn't
have gotten a warrant. But what they saw was evidence or what at least Officer Anderson
saw, was evidence of the commission of a crime" (R. 99:25). Thus, the trial court upheld the
entr> into the motel room and ensuing search because they were justified by probable cause
based not primarily on the tip, but on the detectives' observations of defendant's and
Champneys's actions in plain view . See State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App.
1998) ("A seizure is valid under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully present,
(2) the item is in plain view, and (3) the item is clearly incriminating.") (citation omitted).
Defendant does not claim that Detectives Anderson and Ita violated her rights by
merely speaking with Champneys from outside the closed door of her motel room during a
"knock and talk," nor did they (R. 49; 99:3). See United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054,
1059-60 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 152 (2001) (" Law enforcement officers may
encroach upon the curtilage of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the
occupants."); United States v. Davis, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964) ("Absent express
orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private
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or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right
of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock
on the front door of any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the
occupant thereof— whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.")
The trial court found that a tip that drugs were being dealt from a motel room "certainly gives
the officers the right to go over and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want
to talk with them," a finding defendant does not dispute (R. 99:24).
Further, defendant does not dispute that the crack pipe Detective Anderson saw and
defendant's highly suspicious conduct was in his plain view and, therefore, the fruit of an
legal search. "It is well established law that a government official does not engage in a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if he observes incriminating evidence from a
place where he has a right to be." State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983) (finding
lawful right to observe "extends to . . . front doors and other open areas accessible to the
public at large."); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1993) ("We have
held that officers walking up to the front door of a house can look inside through a partially
draped open window without conducting a Fourth Amendment search."); United States v.
Hersh, 464 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir.) (viewing inculpatory evidence of illegal drug activity in
plain view through partially curtained windows of residence not an illegal "search" within
purview of Fourth Amendment), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1008,1059-60,93 S. Ct. 442 (1972).
Consequently, defendant does not dispute the well-established rule that, assuming exigent
circumstances, police may seize incriminating evidence observed in plain view.
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Rather, defendant challenges the trial court's findings and conclusions, arguing that
what the detectives observed was not incriminating -- that it did not constitute probable cause
to break into the motel room and to search. Aplt. Br. at 19. That argument runs counter to
the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact and sound conclusions of law.
Detective Anderson consistently testified, both at the preliminary hearing and at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, that he saw defendant try to conceal what he believed was
a crack pipe (R. 27,35,41; 99:4,6,11 -12). The trial court correctly recognized that although
Detective Anderson was apparently wrong about actually seeing a "crack pipe," the error was
immaterial because his belief was reasonable:
It turned out he was wrong as to this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when
he thought it was a crack pipe[J but I don't find anything inherently
unreasonable about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even
though it was wrong. Whether it's right or wrong is not important. It's what
he reasonably thought it was at the time . . . and I'm satisfied that Officer
Anderson, by what he saw, thought that he observed a [sic] drug paraphernalia.
(R. 99:25).12 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e), at 37 (3d ed. 1996)
noting probable cause may be supported by a reasonable mistake) (citing Maryland v.
Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1018 (1987) (recognizing "the need to allow
some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dangerous and difficult
process of making arrests")); United States v. Gonzales, 969 F. 2d 999, 1004(1 lth Cir. 1992)
(holding that officer's identification of the defendant's wife acting suspiciously "was
ultimately found to be mistaken does not detract from the contribution this impression - //
12

The State does not concede that Detective Anderson was mistaken. Although
only a spoon was found in the purse, a crack pipe was found in Champneys's pocket
{99:\2\ Champneys, R. 43).
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his mistake was objectively reasonable -made at the time to the totality of the circumstances
leading to probable cause"); State v. Keitz* 856 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1993) (plain view
test for "clearly incriminating" evidence requires "an officer must only have a reasonable
belief 'that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a
crime; it does not demand any showing that such belief be correct'") (citations omitted),
abrogated on other grounds, State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857 (Utah 1994).
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to "use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to . . . ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body." Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 (1999). When Detective Anderson saw defendant
attempt to hide the "crack pipe," he saw her engaged in illegal activity. At that point, the
detectives were justified in arresting and searching her. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999)
("A peace officer may . . ., without warrant, arrest a person: (1) for any public offense
committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer;" or (3) when he has reasonable
cause to believe the person has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for
believing the person may . . . (b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the
offense).
Champneys's actions also justified the detectives in arresting her as a party to
defendant's illegal activity and searching her.13 See State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220,227-28
(Utah App. 1995) (finding probable cause to arrest and search incident to arrest for
13

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999) ("Every person, acting with the mental
state required for the commission of the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes
an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.")
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possession of marijuana upon the defendant's e\ asive conduct and attempt to hide something
and experienced officer's detecting odor of marijuana, which defendant denied smoking).
The trial court findings, undisputed by defendant, are that at essentially the same time
that defendant put the "crack pipe" into her purse, "fb/oth defendants were running around
the room, putting items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the
bathroom" (R. 92). From the bench, the court observed,
Then, when I add to [Detective Anderson's belief that he saw a crack
pipe] the fact that when they . . . identified themselves as police officers, the
activity starts in the room that is consistent, may be consistent with cleaning
up the room[,] but that doesn't make sense. It's much more consistent under
the circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of controlled
substances. The officer testified that in his opinion, and it doesn't take a
rocket scientist to know that, because controlled substances are disposable by
flushing them down the toilet. There's a lot of activity, moving things about,
going back and forth. All of that gives probable cause to enter the room and
it also, because of the nature of the conduct, provides the sufficient exigent
circumstances to kick in the door.
(R. 25-26). The trial court also found that Champneys refused to open the door and applied
a deadbolt even after the detectives told her that they would force it open (R. 92). In sum,
the detectives' direct observations of Champneys' criminal conduct sufficiently support the
trial court's conclusion that there was probable cause to believe she too was involved in
illegal drug activity. Applying the MulcahylValenzuela analysis only strengthens that
conclusion.
2.

The informant *s tip, taken with Officer Anderson 's observations,
amply established probable cause to enter and search the motel room.

As noted above, this Court in Valenzuela applied its analysis of reasonable suspicion
to justify a traffic stop in Mulcahy, to determine probable cause when the police rely on an
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informant's tip: I) the "type of tip or informant involved," 2) "whether the informant gave
enough detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop," and 3) "whether the
police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report on the informants tip."
Valenzuela 2001 UT App 332, at 1115. at 235, 236. This Court found its approach in
weighing these factors, "consistent with the recent Utah Supreme Court decision embracing
the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis articulated in Gates" Id. at 1J17 (citing State v
Anderson,9\0P.2d 1229,1233 (Utah 1996)). See State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, at 1121,
40 P.3d 1136 (holding that minimal corroboration of the informant's tip was sufficient
because the reliability of the information was high); Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, at 1(31
(finding under the totality of the circumstances that a police officer did not have probable
cause to arrest the defendant because information supplied by the informant was insufficient
by itself and the officer had not corroborated the report).
In this case, the strength of probable cause grows with consideration of each
successive factor, until, as argued at Point I.A.I, above, the detectives' direct observations
fully and independently confirm the tip, that defendant and her companion were engaged in
illegal activity involving narcotics. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 ("The officer may
corroborate the tip . . . by observing the illegal activity!.]") (citation omitted).
The first Mulcahy factor - the informant's identity
Mulcahy first looks at the identity of the informant. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235. In
Mulcahy, the police informant was an ordinary citizen who identified himself to police
dispatch. Id. at 233. This Court held that an "ordinary citizen-informant needs no
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independent proof of reliability or veracity. Id. at 235 (quotations and citations omitted)
This is because a citizen informant volunteers information, not for personal benefit, but out
of concern for the community and because an identified citizen informant is exposed to
liability if the information is false. Id.
In this case, the classification of the informant is unclear. While Detective Anderson
clearly testified at the preliminary hearing that the tip came from defendant's husband, he
was unable at the suppression hearing to recall whom the tip came from (Champneys, R. 4748; 99:3, 9). The trial court treated the tip an "anonymous" (R. 91; 99:24). Although an
anonymous tip is "toward the lower end of the reliability scale," it may still support a finding
of probable cause in when balanced with the other circumstances. Anonymous tips have an
important place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "[S]uch tips, particularly when
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contnbute to the solution of
otherwise 'perfect crimes.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38, 103 S. Ct. at 2334-36 (finding
probable caused where anonymous tip was detailed and substantially corroborated by police
investigation). Here, like the citizen informant in Mulcahy, there is no evidence that the
informant stood to gain by supplying the police with information. Moreover the reliability
of the anonymous tip was augmented by its detail and ultimate corroboration.
The second Mulcahy factor - the level of detail supplied by the informant
The second factor in the Mulcahy analysis is the level of detail given by the informant.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236. Again, because probable cause was established by the detective's
direct observations, only a low level of detail is required to justify the search.
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In Mulcahy, the informant told the police that a drunk individual, possibK named
"Joe," had been at the informant's front door and had driven away in a white car, "mavbe"
a Toyota Cehca. Id. at 233. He also told the dispatcher the direction the car was headed and
supplied, what he believed was, "Joe's" phone number. Id. This Court found that the
informant "supplied sufficient detail to support a stop and detention," even though the officer
observed no traffic violations or signs of intoxication. Id. at 234, 238.
In a pre-Mulcahy case, the Utah Supreme Court found probable cause for a roadside
arrest and vehicle search on details given in a tip comparable to those in Mulcahy. See
Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233. In that case, the defendant's girlfriend reported to the police
that the defendant had gone to Las Vegas to purchase methamphetamine. Id. at 1230. She
also told police that the defendant and a companion would be returning to Millard County
the following afternoon, in the defendant's Cadillac, via highway 257. Id. She then
indicated that the defendant might be armed. Id. The following day, a second, confidential
informant, confirmed the information the defendant's girlfriend had given the police. Id.
The court found that the reliability of the girlfriend's statement was high because she
supplied a substantial amount of detail. Id. at 1233. Additionally, her statement was verified
in almost every aspect by the second informant. Id.
The detail supplied by the informant in this case is comparable to that in Mulcahy and
Anderson.

In this case, defendant's husband told dispatch that "Lisa and Rebecca[,

defendant,] were in room 236" of the Motel 6 located at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake (R.
40; 99:2-3). The informant told the police that these women were "engaging in illegal
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activit} - either using or selling narcotics" (R. 34; 99:2). Like the officers in both Muk ah\
and Anderson, the detectives were told the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the number
of possible suspects engaged in the illegal activity, the precise location of crime and the
suspects, and the type of criminal behavior those suspects were engaging in. Although, the
informant did not state his basis of knowledge concerning the information, the detectives
would reasonably have relied on a family member's report presumably based on first-hand
observation. See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, at ^[19 (family member's tip concerning the
defendant's use of a methamphetamine lab significant because it based on personal
observation); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 238 (crediting informant's tip about drunk driver because
it was evidently based on first hand observations). In sum, the informant's tip was
sufficiently detailed to support a finding of probable cause when supplemented with the
detectives' corroborating observations.
The third Mulcahy factor - the police officer's confirmation of the tip
'The officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by
finding the person, the vehicle and the location substantially as described by the informant."
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (citation omitted). In Mulcahy, the tip alerted police to an alleged
drunken driver, but the investigating officer did not observe signs of intoxication in the
defendant's driving pattern. Id. at 233. Consequently, this Court focused on the second
means of corroboration, the confirmation of the "innocent details" to establish the tip's
reliability. Id. at 236 (citing State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)). Since
criminals naturally tend to hide their illegal activity, Utah courts have regularly taken the tack
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used in Mulcahy. See Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233 (concluding that because "officers had
personally verified every aspect of the informants' reports except whether [the defendants]
were actually transporting methamphetamine . . ., the police could justifiably conclude that
the rest of the reports would also be true"); DeLuna, 2001 UT App 401, at 1J20 (recognizing
difficulty of confirming tip about family member's methamphetamine lab where police could
not observe the alleged illegal activity or the facts provided by informants without entering
the defendant's apartment); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516, 518 (Utah App. 1992)
(upholding probable cause to support search warrant where police confirmed all information
supplied by informant except that pertaining to physical evidence of dmg use and
manufacture).
Lacking direct observations of illegal conduct, this Court has held that
"[corroboration by the police officer means, in light of the circumstances, [that] he confirms
enough facts so that he may reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable."
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 189 (Tex. App. 1995))
(internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, Utah's appellate courts have found official
corroboration of a tip sufficient on far slimmer facts than in this case. See Anderson, 910
P.2d at 1233 (the defendant's name, vehicle make, route, destination, date and time of
departure and arrival); Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237-38 (vehicle color, route, direction of travel,
time of departure); Purser, 828 P.2d at 518 (the defendant's address, vehicle registration,
police record, foot traffic to and from the defendant's house).
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In contradistinction to those cases referenced above, the detectives in this case
corroborated the reliability of the tip not only by confirming all of the innocent details, but
also by observing defendant's illegal conduct. The tip informed Detectives Anderson and Ita
that defendant and Champneys were involved in illegal drug activity in room 236 at the
Motel 6 at 1990 North Temple in Salt Lake City (99:2-3; Champneys, R. 40) The detectives
went to the motel room identified by the informant and confirmed that two females were m
the motel room and that those women were defendant and Champneys (R. 99 3-5,
Champneys R. 41). In accord with the tnal court's findings, the State acknowledges that at
this point the detectives lacked probable cause to search (R. 99:25). However, Detective
Anderson contemporaneously observed defendant and Champneys involved in plainly illegal
drug-related activity, hiding drug paraphernalia. See Aple. Br. at Pt. IIA1, above. In sum,
the totality of the detectives' observations amply confirmed the reliability of the tip and
supported probable cause to both arrest and search defendant and Champneys.
B.

Defendant's behavior created exigent circumstances,
justifying the warrantless search of the motel room.

The Fourth Amendment adopts a "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant
to a warTant.,, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). Thus,
"searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
Payton v New York, 445 U.S. 573,586,100 S. Ct. 1371,1380 (1980); CityofOrem v Henri,
868 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1994). However, "[police entry into a house without a
warrant is not [ ] always unreasonable." Murdoch v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir
1995)
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One exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances exception.
New York v. Quarks, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 n.3 (1984). Under this
exception, a warrant is not required if the circumstances "involve[ ] a plausible claim of
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.'" Illinois
v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950 (2001). In these circumstances, "4the
exigencies of the situation' make the need of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98
S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) {quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S. Ct.
191, 193 (1948)). "Exigent circumstances exist 'only when the inevitable delay incident to
obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action.'" State v. Wells,
928 P.2d 386,389 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting United States v. Satterfieldf 743 F.2d 827, 844
(1 lth Cir. 1984)), affd 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997).
'"While "exigent circumstances" have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle
is reasonableness, and each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at
the time they acted.'" Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1391 (quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447, 370
N.W.2d 166, 170 (Neb. 1985)); see also Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 (holding that "[t]he
determination of exigency is based on the totality of the circumstances").
"Numerous cases have sustained warrantless entries where the circumstances
indicated that evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until a warrant
could be obtained." State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258, 1259 n.10, (Utah 1987) (citations
omitted). See also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (1999) (authorizing a police officer to break the

35

door or window of a building to arrest a person reasonably suspected of committing an\
public offense "where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed"). In
Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a suspected drug dealer's house
based on probable cause and exigent circumstances that contraband would be destroyed if
the police did not act immediately and before a warrant could be obtained. Id. at 1258-59.
The evidence in support of exigent circumstances in this case is even weightier than in Ashe.
In Ashe, officers arrested at a parking lot two codefendants, suspected of being
defendant's middlemen, after an undercover officer made a small, initial purchase of cocaine
in what was intended to be a still larger drug deal. Ashe, IAS P.2d at 1257. Based on their
surveillance and voluntary statements of the middleman, officers knew that the defendant's
residence was only two to five minutes from the parking lot and that he expected his
middlemen to "quickly" return to expedite another, larger, purchase. Ashe, 745 P.2d at
1257.

Consequently, the officers were concerned that the defendant would become

suspicious and destroy the remaining cocaine when his accomplices did not return. Id.
When officers arrived at Ashe's home, one of them saw Ashe look out an upstairs window
and then move away. Id. After knocking and identifying themselves, and briefly waiting for
a response, the officers kicked open the front door. Id. Upon entering the residence, the
officers heard a toilet flush and saw two bags containing white residue in the wastebasket
near the toilet. Id. The court found that the "urgency of the situation escalated" with each
of the subsequent events and there was "no realistic opportunity to seek a search warrant
before the exigencies of the matter made it necessary to enter the dwelling." Id. at 1259,
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1260. The court added that the officers did not have to eliminate all innocent explanations
for the behavior they observed, "so long as the explanation advanced by the . . . agents to
support the search appealed] in all probability to be correct." Id. at 1261 (quoting US. v
Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1972)) (first alteration in original).
In this case, Detectives Anderson and Ita arrived at the motel room on a tip that
defendant and Champneys were involved in illegal drug activity (R. 99:2-3). At the motel
room door they knocked and identified themselves (R. 99:3-4). At the same time, Detective
Anderson observed defendant attempt to hide what appeared to be a crack pipe (R. 99:4).
Also, immediately after the detectives identified themselves, Detective Anderson observed
defendant and Champneys "running in the room, putting stuff behind the bed and running
to and from the bathroom" (R. 99:6). He saw the women go to the bathroom "at least three
times" (R. 99:7). Defendant's hurried activity was particularly significant to Detective
Anderson because, in his experience, suspects, especially in hotel rooms, will try to flush
narcotics down the toilet to destroy them (R. 99:7).
The foregoing record established probable cause and exigent circumstances for the
detectives to enter the motel room without a warrant. See Aplt. Br. at Pt. LA. 1. As the trial
court correctly concluded, there was reason for the detectives to believe that defendants were
in the act of destroying controlled substances (R. 93; 99:26). Indeed, the detectives' sense
of the exigency was, if anything, more reasonable than those of officers in Ashe. In Ashe,
the defendant's apparent attempt to destroy incriminating evidence could only be reasonably
assumed, Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1265, whereas in this case those attempts were actually observed.
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In sum, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence
POINT III
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR IN TENDERING HER GUILTY
PLEA, WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, WAS PROPERLY TAKEN
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly failed to allow her to withdraw her
guilty plea by failing to inform her of her constitutionally protected rights, as prov tded by
rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Aplt. Br. at 22-28. Not only does the claim
lack merit, but this Court should not consider it because defendant invited any error.
A. Defendant invited any error in the rule 11 colloquy.
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 by not
informing defendant that by pleading guilty she was surrendering her right to a speedy trial
and that her right of appeal was limited. Aplt. Br. at 22-28.l4 However, defendant invited
this error by preparing a plea statement deficient and then tendering it to the trial court in
support of her guilty plea.
"'[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led
the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309,1f54,
989 P.2d 1091 (quotingState v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 1996)). "The doctrine
of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it
on appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v.
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Rule 11(e) provides: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest
or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found (3) the
defendant knows of. . . the right to a speedy public trial before and impartial jury . . . and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited."
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Henderson, 792 P.2d 514, 516 (Wash. 1990)); accord State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220
(Utah 1993). The purpose of this rule is to discourage a defendant in a criminal case from
inviting prejudicial error and then implanting it is the record "as a form of appellate insurance
against an adverse sentence." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989), habeas
corpus denied by Parson v. Galetka, 57 F. Supp.2d 1151 (1999). See State v. Bradley, 2002
UT App 548, f 39, 57 P.3d 1139 (finding invited error in failure to draft a limiting instruction
expressly requested by the court and on which jury would undoubtedly have been instructed
if presented).
Additionally, even plain error will not result in a reversal where the defendant has led
the trial court into error. For example, a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the facts of the case. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997)
(citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utahl981)). Notwithstanding the duty to properly
instruct the jury, the Utah Supreme Court found in State v. Anderson, that a defendant's
failure to object to an elements instruction, "even when specifically queried by the court,"
constituted invited error. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996) (citing
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (declining to consider to "seemingly] illadvised" instruction as manifestly erroneous, where defendant's counsel consciously chose
not to object and "affirmatively led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong
with the instruction")).

In Perdue, this Court refused to consider correctness of an

instruction submitted by counsel "because if there was error, it was invited by defendant, and
where invited error butts up against manifest injustice, the invited error rule prevails"
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Perdue, 813 P 2d at 1206 (emphasis added). Relying on Perdue, this Court has repeated!}
refused to consider a plain error claim when the error was invited. Chane\, 1999 LT App
309, at ^[54, 989 P.2d 1091 (refusing to consider claim of manifest injustice on appeal after
the defendant objected to correct jury instruction offered by court at tnal).
"'Rule 11(e) squarely places on tnal courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional
and rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v Dean,
2002 UT App 323, ^[5, 57 P.3d 1106 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1209, 1312 (Utah
1987)). Notwithstanding that duty, this Court should, as it has in cases involving invited
error to jury instructions, decline to consider defendant's claim that the trial court omitted
two rule 11 requirements from defendant's plea-taking. First, as set out below, the trial court
strictly complied with rule 11. Aple. Br. at Pt. IIIB. But more importantly for this
discussion, defendant invited any conceivable error by preparing the deficient plea statement
and presenting it to the trial court, necessarily implying that it accurately set out those
constitutional rights that defendant was surrendering in pleading guilty.
At defendant's change-of-plea hearing, in the presence of defendant, Ms. Champneys,
and their respective counsel, the trial court heard that both defendants were reserving their
right to challenge the denial of their motion to suppress evidence by conditionally pleading
guilty under State v. Very(R. 100:2).l5 To emphasize and make clear to both defendants the
significance of their conditional plea, the trial court stated: "[So everybody is clear on that,

,s

758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988).
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[it] means you can appeal it" (R. 100:1,4).16 Defendant's counsel acknowledged the court's
clarification: 'That's correct" (R. 100:4). Throughout the colloquy, which defendant now
claims lacked reference to only the right to a "speedy" trial (rule 11(e)(3)) and notice that
defendant's right of appeal was limited (rule 11 (e)(8)), the trial court repeatedly elicited from
defendant that by pleading guilty she was voluntarily waiving those rights identified by the
court (R. 100:5-11). See subdivision 11(e)(3) ("The court.. . may not accept the plea until
the court has found . . . the defendant knows . . . that by entering the plea, [the foregoing]
rights are waived.")
After explaining the significance of defendant's conditional plea, the court turned its
attention to defendant's plea statement and thereafter relied on it (R. 100:4; Statement of
Defendant, R. 56-62, attached at Addendum F). See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1160
(Utah App. 1998) (recognizing that strict compliance with rule 11 may be accomplished
through a plea affidavit adequately incorporated into the record by evidence that the
defendant read, understood, and acknowledged the document) (citing State v. Magaire, 830
P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1992)). The statement stated: "I know that I have a right to a trial in
open court by an impartial jury, and that I am giving up that right by pleading guilty" (R. 58).
The statement omitted the word "speedy" from defendant's trial right. Although the court
informed defendant that by pleading she was giving up her right to the trial before an
impartial jury, scheduled for the following Monday, the trial court neglected to include the
word "speedy" in its colloquy (R. 100:7-9).
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The transcript of the plea-taking (R. 100:1-16) is attached at Addendum E.
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However, any deficiency in the plea-taking is attributable to defendant because the
trial court so clearly relied on the sufficiency of her statement, whose adequacy defendant's
counsel vouched for.

At the outset, the court was informed by defendant's counsel that a

change-of-plea statement had been prepared, that counsel had reviewed the statement w ith
defendant, that defendant had plenty of time to review the statement, and that counsel
believed defendant understood the statement (R. 100:4-5). The court queried defendant
about the importance of the rights "contained in that document" that she would be giving up
that by pleading guilty (R. 100:5). The court then elicited from defendant her understanding
that if she gave up her right to the trial, scheduled for the following Monday, "that you give
up an [sic] important and significant constitutional and statutory rights as outlined in the
paper you both read" (R. 100:7).
Moreover, defense counsel assured the court that the colloquy was complete. The
court inquired: "Counsel, anything else either one of you would have me ask you client
regarding rule 11 requirements?" (R. 100:12). Defendant's counsel answered, "I have
nothing, Your Honor" (R. 100:12). The court signed the statement, asserting that it believed
defendant understood her rights she was surrendering and that she had voluntarily entered
her plea (R. 100:14-15). Finally, at the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty
plea, defendant's counsel acknowledged that defendant had been notified at the plea-taking
that her trial had seen set for the following Monday and agreed with the trial court that it
"[c]an't get much speedier than that" (R. 182:4-5).
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It is evident that defendant's counsel presented an incomplete plea statement to the
trial court and that the trial court relied on it. Furthermore, defense counsel assure the court
at the time that the colloquy was sufficient. Based on well-established law, this Court should
find that by her actions defendant affirmatively led the trial court into any error and it should
decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim.
B. The trial court strictly complied with the requirements of rule 11.
As noted above, defendant claims that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule
11 by not informing defendant that by pleading guilty she was surrendering her right to a
speedy trial and that her right of appeal was limited. Aplt. Br. at 22-28. Because the context
in which defendant offered her plea makes clear that she understood the rights claimed
omitted from the court's colloquy, the claim is meritless.
In State v. Visser, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that the trial court failed
to strictly comply with rule 11(e) when it omitted the term "speedy" in informing the
defendant of his right to a speedy public trial. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,ffl[l3,17,22 P.3d
1242. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty mid-trial, and one day after trial moved to
withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at ff 3-6. In rejecting the rule 11 claim, the court recited
subdivision 11(e)(8), recognizing that "the rule is stated permissively and thus does not
prevent a court from taking into account other record factors in making its finding." Id. at
If 12.17 The court concluded that because Visser was in the middle of a trial and understood
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Subdivision 11(e)(8) provides: "[The findings mandated by rule 11] may be
based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and
acknowledged the contents of the sworn statement."
43

from the trial court that he had a right to continue \v ith trial at the time he pleaded guiltv an\
"recitation, either orally or by affidavit, that [he] had the 'right to a speedy trial/ \\ ould ha\ e
communicated no more than his actual trial experience to that point " Id at ^ 14 The facts
as to each of defendant's claims in this case are analogous to those in Visser
Advisement that right of appeal is limited
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial judge also failed to inform [defendant] that her
guilty plea limited her nght to appeal," under subdivision 11(e)(8), because it "failed,
however, to determine whether [she] understood that by pleading guilty she was waiving her
right to challenge all . nonjunsdictional issues on appeal," other than her nght to appeal
the denial of her motion to suppress. Aplt. Br. at 25. The claim is mentless
First, it would appear that the requirement under subdivision 11(e)(8), that "the
defendant be advised that the nght of appeal is limited," applies only to conditional pleas and
that defendant received precisely the notice required. When Gibbons issued in 1987,
subdivision 11(e)(8) did not exist. See Gibbons, 740 P 2d at 1312, Utah R Cnm P 11
(1993) amendment note (attached at Addendum K). In 1993, subdivision (e)(8) and (I), the
latter providing for conditional pleas, were added to rule 11 18 Utah R Cnm P 11 (1993)
amendment note. Thus, it appears clear that subdivision 1 l(e)(8)'s "limited nght of appeal"
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Rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure, provides.

With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution , a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or
no contest, reserving in the record the nght, on appeal from the judgment, to
a review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-tnal motion A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
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contemplates only the circumstance in which a defendant pleads conditionally guilt).
Indeed, there is no other circumstance apart from a conditional plea in which subdivision
11(e)(8) makes sense, especially in light of the express notice in subdivision (e)(3) already
informing defendant that pleading guilty constitutes a waiver, i.e., nonappealability, of
constitutional rights.
Even if subdivision 11(e)(8) were not directed only to conditional pleas, defendant
received complete information as to the limitations on her right to appeal. As set out in detail
above, see Aple. Br. at Pt. IIIA, the trial court elicited from defendant's counsel, in
defendant's presence, that a conditional plea under Sery meant that she could appeal the
denial of her motion to suppress evidence, an option defendant has clearly exercised (R.
100:4-5). Additionally, the trial court elicited from defendant, and defendant does not
dispute, her understanding that by pleading guilty she was surrendering all constitutional and
statutory rights other than the right to a "speedy" trial (R. 100:5-11). Moreover, defendant
does not challenge that her plea statement was not adequately incorporated into the colloquy,
or except for the omission of "speedy" trial, that the statement states fails to inform her that
by pleading guilty she waives all stated constitutional and statutory rights or that it did not
indicate that the plea was entered into under State v. Sery (Plea statement, R. 56-62). In fact,
by filing a notice of appeal and having this Court accept her appeal from the denial of her
motion to suppress, defendant received precisely the right she preserved by pleading guilt,
which negates any claim that the plea colloquy was deficient. Cf. Visser, 2000 UT 88, at^f 14
(actual experience effectively communicated rule 11(3) right). In sum, apart from reference
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to "speedy" trial, defendant was made abundantly aware of her right of appeal and its
limitation.
Speedy trial
By her experience at the plea-taking, defendant was fully informed that she had a right
to a speedy trial which she would be surrendering by pleading guilty. At the beginning of
the plea-taking, in defendant's and her counsel's presence, the trial court noted that the case
was set for trial the following Monday (R. 100:1-2). Thereafter, the court elicited from
defendant that she understood that she would be giving important constitutional and statutory
rights "if you give up your right to have a trial which is scheduled next Monday" (R. 100:7).
Immediately afterward, the court emphasized that it wanted to make sure defendant was clear
that "[I]f you plead guilty, there's no trial next Monday. Do you understand that?" (R.
100:7). Defendant answered affirmatively (R. 100:7). Six months later, at the hearing on
defendant's motion to withdraw her plea, defendant's counsel acknowledged that at the pleataking his client had been informed that trial was set for the following Monday, a setting
which "[c]an't get much speedier than that" (R. 182:4-5). On these facts, defendant's
"experience communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation of the 'right
to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury.'" Visser, 2000 UT 88, atfl3. Accordingly,
the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's rights were properly explained to her (R.
182:5). Defendant's claim is frivolous.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that this
affirm defendant's conviction.

-rf
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %1

day of February, 2003.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

7
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KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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were hand delivered to Kent R. Hart and Patrick L. Anderson, Salt lake Legal Defender
Association, attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this %7 day of February, 2003.
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Addendum A

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures*]
Theright
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
e
w*' *?*in*t unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-2-202.

Criminal responsibility for direct commission
of offense or for conduct of another.

Every person, acting with the mental state requiredforthe commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, ™™m«Hf
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a partyforsuch conduct

77*74, Arrest by pence officers.
A pesos officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without warrant, arrest a person:
(1)forany public oflbneo committed or attempted in the presence of any
peace officer, "pceeeneo* includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has rsesonshle cause to believe a felony or a class A
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reesonahle cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, sad there ia reeeonshle cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himeelf to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.

77*7-8. Doors and windows may be broken, when.
lb make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases,
a peace officer, may break the door or window of the building in which the
person to be arrested is, or in which there are reasonable grounds for believing
him to be. Before making the break, the person shall demand admission and
explain the purpose for which admission is desired Demand and explanation
need not be given before breaking under the exceptions in Section 77-7-6 or
where there is reason to believe evidence will be secreted or destroyed.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record
or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the
contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read
or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by
the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not
binding on the court.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule U

(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether the
proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996; November 1, 1997; November 1, 2001.)

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact,
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry
of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion.
Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is
filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of
appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion
as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party,
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice
of appeal.
(Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.)

Addendum B

SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; SEPTEMBER 19, 2001
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

The State of Utah vs. Rebecca Champneys,

Case #011905093 and State of Utah vs. Liza Victoria Corwell,
Case #011905094. Let the record reflect that the matter for
hearing is the Defendant's Motion for - Motion to Suppress.
Appearances please.
MS. TAYLOR:

Lana Taylor on behalf of the State.

MR. ANDERSON:

Patrick Anderson with Mrs. Corwell,

Your Honor.
MR. FINLAYSON:

Dave Finlayson with Ms. Champneys.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, what I've received
and reviewed is the motion of defendant Rebecca Champneys to
suppress some supporting memoranda and I've read the State's
response and I've received the preliminary hearing and I
haven't read it in great detail, but I've read what I thought
were the pertinent portions.

So, with that, are we ready to

proceed?
MS* TAYLOR:
THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:

We are, Your Honor.
Call your first witness.
The State would call Detective Troy

Anderson.
THE COURT:

If you'll come forward and be sworn

please, sir.
1

1 i

TROY ANDERSON

2

having been duly sworn testified upon

3

his oath as follows:

4
5
6
7

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. TAYLOR:
Q

Detective Anderson, please state your full name and

spell your last name for the record.

8

A

It's Troy Anderson, A-N-D-E-R-S-O-N.

9

Q

And where are you currently employed?

10

A

Salt Lake City Police Department in the Narcotics

11
12
13

Division.
Q

And on March 13 of this year, did you have occasion

to investigate a case at 1990 West North Temple?

14

A

I did.

15

Q

What led to your investigation?

16

A

We had received information that there were some

17

individuals in the hotel room, I believe it was 236, for

18

possibly using and/or selling narcotics.

19

Q

And where did that information come from?

20

A

I believe it was a telephonic, a phone call, that on

21

of the detectives, Detective Etta I believe, had received.

22

THE COURT:

23

THE WITNESS:

24
25

Say that again, sir.
I believe it was a telephone call made

to Detective Etta.
THE COURT:

Oh. All right, he was out there with you

THE WITNESS:

Correct.

He was one of the detectives

with me, that's correct.
Q

(BY MS. TAYLOR)

And in that phone call, did the

person making the call identify themselves?
A

I don't recall.

I didn't take the phone call.

I'm

not sure.
Q

And was there any specific information about any

particular individuals involved?
A

Yeah.

I believe the name was Lisa, I think it was

Crawell, Crowell.
Q

So based on that information, what did you do?

A

We responded to the Motel 6 and responded to that

room number and we did what's called a knock and talk.
Q

Prior to that had you had any conversations with any

of management of the Motel 6?
A

Before that, I don't believe we had.

Q

What did you do when you were at the room?

A

Detective Etta knocked on the door.

I was with him.

He knocked on the door. A female individual asked who it was.
Q

I'm sorry, I want to stop you.

Did they open the

door at that time?
A

No, they did not.

Q

What did the female say?

A

She asked who it was and Detective Etta's response

was, it's Tracy.

That's his first name.
3

1 ,

Q

And was there any response when he said that?

2

A

I believe she asked, who? At which time he again said

3

it's Tracy and then he responded that it was Tracy with the

4

Salt Lake City Police Department.

5

Q

Then what happened?

6

A

While he was doing this I could see into the curtain

7

and I could see a female at the door, the female that he was

8

engaging in conversation.

9

badge.

She asked at that point to see a

He showed his badge to her through a peep hole or an

10

eye hole in the door.

11

curtain and the door and I could see the individual, so I

12

showed by badge at which time I saw her lean down and look at

13

my badge.

14
15

Q

I could also see a gap between the

And how much of a gap between the window curtain and

the door was there at that time?

16

A

Probably six to twelve inches.

17

Q

What happened after you and Detective Etta displayed

18

your badges?

19

A

At that point I could see quite a lot of movement in

20

the room,

I saw the individual known later to me as Lisa, put

21

what I thought was a crack pipe into a purse.

22

two individuals running around the room.

23

the bathroom a couple of time each.

24

stuff behind the bed, like under the bed on the, what would be

25

like the north side of the bed.

I could see the

They both went into

I could see them putting

Q

Let me go back.

When was the first time that you saw

the individual identified as Lisa?
A

While I was engaged with conversation, I believe her

name is Rebecca at the door, I could see Lisa, who was later
known to me as Lisa, another female behind her in the room.
Q

Did you or any of the other detectives have any

conversation with Lisa at that time?
A

I know that I asked if there was anybody in the room

and Rebecca stated that Lisa wasn't there and I saw the second
female and if I recall correctly, she told me at that point,
that that was Lisa.
Q

Who told you that was Lisa?

A

I believe it was Rebecca.

Q

And did you have any conversation with Lisa at that

time?
A

No.

Q

Now, at what point - let me go back.

When you first

- the window was open, the six to twelve inches that you
stated?
A

Right.

Q

When you first were talking to someone in the room

and first displayed your badges, how many people could you see
in the room?
A

Initially I could see one individual and then shortly

thereafter I could see the second individual behind her.
5

1

Q

And at what point, you say you saw some movement in

2 I the room, at what point did that occur?
3

A

As we were talking to Rebecca, at one point, after

4

we'd showed the badges and I had asked her to open the door,

5

she had actually tried to close the curtain which had narrowed

6

the gap that I could see in the opening, however, I could still

7

see into the room and there was a mirror on the wall which

8

would have been to my lefthand side and I could see into the

9

room and see the reflection in the mirror that mirrored back

10

into the room.

11

individual who I believe is Lisa and Rebecca running in the

12

room, putting the stuff behind the bed and running to and from

13

the bathroom.

14

Q

At that point is when I could see the second

At what point - you say you saw Lisa putting

15

something into a purse?

16

course of this?

17
18

A

At what point did that occur in the

That was almost immediately after I had showed

Rebecca my badge through the window.

19

Q

And what did it appear to be that she put in the bag?

20

A

I initially thought that it was a crack pipe.

It was

21

a metallic object that looked the size and shape of a crack

22

pipe to me.

23

Q

24
25

So does that constitute, I guess the beginning of the

movement that you mentioned in the room?
A

Yes. That was the first thing that I noticed.

Q

And after that point were both of the individuals in

the room making the movements that you talked about?
A

Yes.

I saw both individuals go to the bathroom at

least three times.

It was back and forth at least three times.

Q

And did they appear to have anything in their hands?

A

I couldn't see anything in their hands.

Q

Before they went into the bathroom did they appear to

pick up anything or do anything with any objects?
A

Other than I initially saw the crack pipe and I again

saw, I believe it was Lisa, putting the purse behind the bed or
the bag and then they were going into the bathroom.
Q

And did all of this movement that you've talked

about, did that indicate anything to you?
A

Yeah, it's been my experience that a lot of times,

especially in hotel rooms, people will try to flush, especially
narcotics, cocaine, or anything that can be flushed basically.
Q

All right. What happened after you saw this

movement, all this stuff going on in the motel room through the
crack in the drapes?
A

What happened next?

Q

Uh-huh (affirmative).

A

As this was happening, Detective Tracy had gone and

spoke to the manager and what I was told was Detective Tracy
was told by the manager or the employee at the time that if
there was illegal drug use going on in the hotel room, that
7

they were to be kicked out.

They didn't want them in there and

he had given Detective Tracy a key*

About that time Detective

Tracy had returned back to the motel room and I told Rebecca
that she needed to open the door*
tried to use the key.
deadbolt.

She refused to do that-

We

The key didn't work because they had the

It's actually not a deadbolt, it's like the flap

over lock that's common in motel rooms.

They had that engaged.

I told her to open the door or we'd have to force it open.
They again refused at which time the door was kicked.

As the

door was being kicked, someone screamed that they would open
the door and essentially it was too late because Detective
Tracy had kicked the door a second time and it had come open at
that point.
Q

Did the officers then enter the room?

A

We did.

Q

And in that room did you find evidence that relates

to this case?
A

We did.
MS. TAYLOR:

I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Cross?
MR. ANDERSON:

Yes, Your Honor.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. ANDERSON:
Q

It is detective, right?

A

Yes sir.
8

Q

Detective Anderson, you said that you had Detective

Etta had intelligence, correct?
A

That's correct.

Q

You didn't know if there was a specific name or if it

was an anonymous source.

You just knew that he had some

intelligence.
A

I knew that he had the name of Lisa Crowell from that

intelligence report but I don't know - I believe is was a nonmis-complaint but I don't know from whom.
Q

When you got to the hotel, how long was it after you

got to the hotel room you went up to the room an knocked on the
door?
A

How long from the time we arrived at the hotel to the

time we went to the room?
Q

Yes.

A

A few minutes.

Q

So you didn't stake the hotel out?

A

No.

Q

You didn't see anybody coming and going from the

room?
A

No.

Q

You didn't talk to the manager about whether people

had been coming and going from the room?
A

I did not.

Q

To your knowledge did anybody?
9

1 I

A

Not to my knowledge.

2

Q

Okay.

So you didn't have any independent information

3

that there was anything peculiar or unusual about this room

4

when you arrived at the hotel?

5

A

I'm sorry?

6

Q

You didn't have any personal observations of anything

7

unusual occurring at this hotel?

8

A

No.

9

Q

And you knock on the door and Officer Etta says, it's

10

Tracy?

11

A

Correct.

12

Q

That's correct?

13

detectives.

14

A

Initially that's correct.

15

Q

Initially.

16

Not, Salt Lake City Police, not

He said, it's Tracy.

Then the person said who?

He said, it's

Tracy a second time?

17

A

Correct.

18

Q

It was only after the third inquiry that he

19
20

identified himself as a police officer?
A

I believe the second time he said, it's Tracy and the

21

response was again who or something to that effect and he said

22

with Salt Lake City Police Department, that's correct.

23
24
25

Q

Then you attempted to show your badges through the

window?
A

I did show my badge through the window.

He showed
10

his through the peep hole.
Q

Do you recall anybody from inside asking for a search

warrant?
A

I don't recall.

Q

Were you in uniform?

A

We were not.

Q

And your badges you just held out or were they on

your body or did you hole them out from a billfold type?
A

They were on a necklace with like a leather

background.
Q

Okay.

People can have fake badges.

That's true,

isn't it?
A

That's true.

Q

Okay.

You said in your report, now you say a crack

pipe today, but when you wrote your report you said that you
observed Lisa place what appeared to be a metallic object in a
black purse on the bed and then you said that the object looked
to be the right shape and size of a crack pipe, correct?
A

Which part are you referring to in the report?

Q

The second paragraph right in the middle.

A

The object looked to me to be the right size and

shape of a crack pipe.
Q

Okay, but you said it was a metallic object.

weren't sure it was a crack pipe.

So you

You just said there was some

object that was consistent with maybe the shape and size of it
11

1

but you weren't sure it was a crack pipe?

2

A

I thought it was a crack pipe.

3

Q

But you said in your report, you said it was just a

4

metallic object that could be a crack pipe?

5

A

I thought it was a crack pipe.

6

Q

When you searched the bag, what did it end up being?

7

It was not a crack pipe, is that correct?

8

A

It was a spoon.

9

Q

When you saw they running around or moving around in

10

the room, either Rebecca or Lisa, you didn't at any time see

11

any drugs?

12

A

No.

13

Q

You didn't see any drugs on the coffee table or on

14

the dresser?

15

A

Prior to entering?

16

Q

Prior to entering the room?

17

A

That's correct.

18

Q

You didn't see any drugs on the bed?

19

A

No.

20

Q

You didn't smell any drugs coming from the room?

21

A

No.
MR. ANDERSON:

22
23

I have no further questions, Your

Honor.

24

THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson?

25

MR. FINLAYSON:

Just a couple of questions if I can
12

Your Honor and I really do only have a couple of questions. We
always say that and then go on ad nauseam.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. FINLAYSON:
Q

You personally, this intelligence report, knew that

there was somebody that may be involved in drug activity?
A

Say it again, I'm sorry.

Q

You testified that the intelligence report you

understood there may be somebody there that's involved in drug
activity?
A

As far as a name, you mean, yes.

Q

Well, just the information.

There's Lisa, right, is

the name?
A

Correct.

Q

But as far as the information simply that there may

be somebody involved in drug activity there?
A

Correct.

Q

Okay. And that's it.

That's as specific as the

intelligence report was to you, right, personally?
A

That's all I recall, yes.

Q

Now, you personably didn't call to try to verify

where that information was coming from or call back to a phone
number?
A

I personally did not.
MR. FINLAYSON:

Okay.

I think that's all I have,
13

1

Your Honor.

2
3

THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, anything further from this
witness?

4

MS. TAYLOR:

5
6

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. TAYLOR:

7
8

Just one question.

Q

You stated that the item that you believed was a

crack pipe turned out to be a spoon?

9

A

That's correct.

10

Q

Was that taken into evidence?

11

A

It was.

12

Q

And why is that?

13

A

Often times, spoons are used to cook or rock up the

14
15
16
17

cocaine.
Q

And did this particular spoon have any indication o

that?
A

I believe it had residue on it, yes.

18

MS. TAYLOR:

19

THE COURT: Anything else?

20
21

Nothing further.

RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. ANDERSON:

22

Q

You didn't observe any residue on this object, this

23

spoon?

24

A

I believe it had residue on it.

25

Q

But when you're looking through the window and it's

1

being put in the purse, you didn't see any residue or anything?
A

No, sir.

Q

She was probably about ten, fifteen feet from you?

A

Probably, yeah, five to ten feet.

Q

When she put it in the purse, was the purse behind

her back or was her purse in between you and her?
A

She was actually profiled.

what would be north to south.
west.

The room I believe faces

The bed is in the room east to

She was on the corner of the bed.

The bag was on the

bed and she was placing the item in the —
Q

Did you see where she picked up this spoon from?

A

I did not.
MR. ANDERSON:

No further questions.

THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson?
MR. FINLAYSON:

I'm sorry, Your Honor, no further

questions.
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:
couple.

Nothing, Your Honor.
Detective, just one thing, maybe a

Is this a hotel, a motel?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

place.

It's a Motel 6, sir.

Oh.

Okay.

So I'm not familiar with the

Tell me, you say it has windows in the side of the door

or something?
THE WITNESS: As I was standing looking at the motel
15

room, the door would be here and like a bay style window to the
right of it.
THE COURT:

So it's kind of a typical motel room

where you got a door and then a window next to it and then the
next unit window?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So, when you looked in, you were

looking directly into the room?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

Now, this movement that you saw where

people appeared to be putting things behind the bed and in the
purses and moving back and forth to the bathrooms, did that
occur before or after or during you identified yourself as
police officers?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

That occurred after.

Okay.

MR. ANDERSON:
MS. TAYLOR:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

No, Your Honor.
Thank you sir.

THE WITNESS:
MS. TAYLOR:

Anything else, counsel?

You may stand down.

Thank you, Your Honor.
The State has no other evidence to

present.
THE COURT:

Is that the extent of the State's

evidence?
MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
16

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Defense going to offer

any evidence?
MR. ANDERSON:

No, Your Honor.

MR. FINLAYSON:

No Your Honor.

THE COURT:
MS. TAYLOR:

Closing remarks?
Your Honor, essentially what we're

looking at here is that the issue before the Court is did the
officers have probable cause and exigent circumstances to enter
the hotel room without a warrant and the information that the
officers had ahead of time was that there was some drug
activity going on in this particular room and that an
individual by the name of Lisa or Lizza was involved in that.
So the officers went to the room.
there, knock on the door.
see into this room.

They had every right to go

They are in a place where they can

The drapes are open enough they can see in

and they ask if Lisa's there. At first they're told no. Then
later it comes out well, yes, in fact, this Lisa is in the room
and so they're able to confirm that bit of their information.
And then they also see what the officer believes is a woman
putting a crack pipe into a purse, which confirms the other end
of it, the drug activity.

So, so far, they're hitting right

with the information they have and I think it's very
significant that after they identified themselves as police,
the evidence of a pipe which is indicative of drug use, that
that purse is hidden, that these individuals are rushing back
1*7

1 , to the bathroom, back and forth and they don't do any of this
2

until the police offi cers identify who they are.

3 I ask to come in.

The officers

They won't let them in and one of the officers

4 I goes and gets the key from the manager because the manager
5

wants them out.

So they've used the key the manager's given

6

them.

7

on the door and I think you've got probable cause and

8

circumstances.

They can't get in the room and so they eventually kick

9

For probably cause you look at all those facts and

10

circumstances known to the officer, including - according to

11

their knowledge and experience, what those things that they see

12

indicate and whether or not they had a reasonable belief that

13

an offense was being committed or had been committed.

14

from what the Officer saw, he believed that these women were at

15

least in possession of drug paraphernalia or at least that one

16

of the women in the room was.

17

enough to show probably cause.

Well,

So I certainly think there's

18

With regard to the exigent circumstances, the Court

19

is again suppose to look at the totality of the circumstances

20

and whether or not the officers acted reasonable in what they

21

did.

22

drugs are the type of evidence that can be destroyed, that in

23

and of itself, does not equal exigent circumstances.

24

this case it goes much further than that.

25

drug activity and then they see these individuals in the room

Now the case law is very clear that the mere fact that

But in

They see evidence of

13

running back and forth to the bathroom which the officer
testified in his experience is very common practice in motel
rooms when people are destroying drugs and the fact that this
occurs after the officers identify themselves, I think,
indicates that there were exigent circumstances that the
officers believed that the evidence was being destroyed, that
these women took it back to the bathroom and because of that,
think they had both probable cause and exigent circumstances
which justify the entry into the room.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

Mr. Anderson?
MR. ANDERSON:

Your Honor, as the Court is aware', in

this type of situation, it's a private promise.
high burden on the State.

They have to show both probably

cause and exigent circumstances.

In this case the probable

cause, they may have had reasonable suspicion.
anonymous tip to go to a hotel room.
room.

There's a ver

They had an

They go to the hotel

They observe no drugs. They observe a metallic object

in the room.

There's no smell or odor of drugs. They didn't

have, I would argue, what would amount to a probable cause at
that place and also, it's almost like the State vs. Beavers
case in that the court in that case, the officer went into a
room and said after he went into the room, he felt danger and
fear for his safety, so he had brought the exigency into the
case.

Well, in this situation, I think the police, their
1

1

activity, they knocked on the door.

2

themselves as police.

3

why, I just remember every time I read this file and think

4

about this case, and I think you're of the generation that can

5

recall this, reminds me of the land shark on Saturday Night

6

Live, when it knocks on the door and it says candy gram.

7
8

11

I just keep going back and I don't know

THE COURT: Actually I'm probably before Saturday
Night Live.

9
10

They didn't identify

MR. ANDERSON:

Oh, you are. Well, I was hoping you'd

remember.
THE COURT:

But I'm certainly wiLling to be educated.

12

Tell me about Saturday Night Live?

13

MR. ANDERSON:

Well, on Saturday Night Live there's a

14

land shark that's going around and killing people in the

15

neighborhood and it's all over the TV and so everybody that

16

knocks on the door and it would say land shark and they would

17

open the door and he would kill them.

18

get smart and so they wouldn't open the door and it would knock

19

on the door and it would say like candy gram and they'd open

20

the door and it would eat them.

21

So bhen they started to

But I guess the reason I go back to that is they

22

knock on the door and they say Tracy and they say it twice and

23

then they identify themselves as police.

24

They simply have a badge.

25

really puts everybody in the room on notice that they really

They're non-uniform.

I mean, I'm not sure that that

20

1

are police officers.

Why didn't they just identify themselves

as police officers the first time and so therefore, add a
little more credibility to the fact that they are police
officers with authority and they're standing outside the door?
They made a misrepresentation so I guess the story is more
amusing to me than anyone else, Your Honor,
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ANDERSON:

But the key is that it's not enough if

you have like a knock and talk, if there is just a reasonable
suspicion.

There has to be probable cause. Also, there has to

be a genuine exigency and Beavers even uses language that the
only risk that exists if an investigory stop is not effected is
the risk that the investigation of "potential criminal activity
might be delayed or at worst thwarted altogether."

That's what

these people were looking at was potential criminal activity.
They had anonymous, non-specific source whom they have never
identified because they can't.

They did not have any

independent observations of any illegal activity and they
simply had people scurrying around the room.
drugs.

They see no

He sees what he says is consistent with what he thinks

is the shape and size of a crack pipe. All it is, is a spoon.
I'd say Your Honor, that that just is not enough to give them
probably cause and that there was not enough of an exigency to
go into the room.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.
21

1 .

Mr. Finlayson, anything you want to add to that?

2

MR. FINLAYSON:

3 I that, Your Honor.

There's not much that I can add to

I think the cases that we provided to Your

4

Honor, (inaudible) vs. JL, talk about anonymous tips.

There

5

certainly was not enough here to even corroborate - there

6

wasn't enough information here that they could have

7

corroborated much, there maybe drug activity and a person named

8

Lisa.

9

provide a probable cause and they just simply didn't see

It's clear under that case, that that's not enough to

10 J anything when they did get there.
11

The only thing they did see was might be a crack pipe

12

which turned out not to be a crack pipe so obviously, the

13

detective wasn't sure it was a crack pipe. Even probably cause

14

of a crack pipe doesn't give you the right to go into the hotel

15

room.

16

the case law, that's such a minor offense, it probably doesn't,

17

you probably can't even use exigent circumstances.

18

You still have to have exigent circumstances and under

But what they do see is a lot of moving around which

19

also could be consistent with cleaning up the apartment.

They

20

don't hear the toilet flushing.

21

person's hands going in and out of the bathroom.

22

putting stuff behind the bed, under the bed, in a purse on the

23

bed consistent with also cleaning up the room.

24

is a hunch and which we know from all the case law, is not

25

enough and it just doesn't quite make it. Even with the Yodder

The don't see anything in the
They see them

What they have

22

case, you know, there's so much in the Yodder case.
a little girl who, they found her clothing.
They know there's criminal activity afoot.

She's missing.
They don't even

know there's any criminal activity afoot here.
have probable cause.

There was

They don't even

That probable cause may be the person

named Lisa is there. But, you know, Yodder was a recent case,
a fairly recent case that really was a totality of the
circumstances case.

It was a very close case but there was

just so much going on.
not on his balcony.

This guy's on his balcony and says he's

He tells the cops he was asleep when they

know he was on his balcony.

The clothes are found nearest his

balcony and all of this, you know, all of this information,
when you've got what you know is criminal activity afoot, a
little girl that's missing and her clothes were found, a very,
more, almost more of an emergency doctrine case and this isn't
even close and so I just don't think they make it.
THE COURT: Ms. Taylor?
MS. TAYLOR:

Your Honor, the totality, the officers

had information that drug activity was going on in the room,
they have information that a person named Lisa is in the room.
They go to the room.
here.

People lie to them and say no, Lisa's not

Then they find out that Lisa is there.

They see what

appears to be paraphernalia and what in the end turns out to be
paraphernalia and they see - I think all those things go to
probably cause.

I think that creates probable cause that
23

1 i information that drug activity is going on, they see things
2

that confirm that, probable cause that there's drug activity in

3

that room and the exigent circumstances are created when these

4

individuals in the room start hiding things.

5

purses, hiding purses behind beds, running back to the

6

bathroom.

7

very consistent with things they've seen in the past destroying

8

evidence.

9

Hiding things in

In their experience as narcotics officers, that is

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you.

10

Submit the matter?

11

MR. ANDERSON:

12

MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Your Honor.

13

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

I think I'm ready to rule on this one.

14

Like most of these matters, what happens in the information,

15

whether it's corroborated or it comes from an anonymous source,

16

builds as the time goes along.

17

look at the totality of the circumstances.

18

So that's why I'm required to

Here we have an anonymous tip that there's drug

19

dealing going on in this room where apparently the defendant,

20

I'll get everybody's name right here - Lisa Corwell is in the

21

room.

22

and knock on the door and talk with people if the people want

23

to talk to them and they did that and they also confirmed,

24

which gives support to the anonymous tip, is that Liza Corwell,

That certainly gives the officers the right to go over

25 I ultimately, she was in the room and so therefore, we haven't
24

haven't just got somebody making a phone call.

We've got

somebody making a phone call with some information that appears
to be at least as far as that's concerned, correct.
Had the officers not been able to see into the room
then of course they would not have had the right to enter the
room.

They couldn't have got a warrant.

But what they saw was

evidence or what at least Officer Anderson saw, was evidence of
the commission of a crime.

It turned out he was wrong as to

this spoon that turned out to be a spoon when he thought it was
a crack pipe but I don't find anything inherently unreasonable
about that observation or that conclusion that he reached, even
though it was wrong.
important.

Whether it's right or wrong, is not

It's what he reasonably thought it was at the time.

That would be like saying, Well, they didn't know there were
drugs but they found them, therefore, it's okay.
accept that either.

We don't

So, it's not the product of the search

that's important or what's actually found, but what is
reasonably in the minds of the person at the time and I'm
satisfied that Officer Anderson, by what he saw, thought that
he observed a drug paraphernalia.
Then, when I add to that the fact that when they
identified them as police officers, identified themselves as
police officers, the activity starts in the room that is
consistent, may be consistent with cleaning up the room but
that doesn't make sense.

It's much more consistent under the
2^

1

circumstances, and at that point in time, with disposing of
controlled substances.

The officer testified that in his

opinion, and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to know that,
because controlled substances are disposable by flushing them
down the toilet.

There's a lot of activity, moving things

about, going back and forth. All of that gives probable cause
to enter the room and it also, because of the nature of the
conduct, provides the sufficient exigent circumstances to kick
in the door.
If the exigent circumstances weren't there, they
would have had to get a warrant.

I'm satisfied there was

enough to get a warrant based on what was expressed to that
point in time and what was observed.

The exigent circumstances

give them the right to kick in the door when it's bolted even
though they - have the key makes no difference.

Who gave them

the key makes no difference, but not being able to get in even
with the key, they had the right to kick down the door because
I think it's reasonable to believe that they thought that there
were controlled substances being destroyed.
the motion is denied.

And so, therefore,

There's probable cause and I believe

there's exigent circumstances.

So let's set the matter for

trial.
MS. TAYLOR:

Your Honor, would you like the State to

prepare findings, conclusions in an order?
THE COURT: Please.
26

Is there some reason we ought to be trying these
cases separately?
MS. TAYLOR:

I don't believe so, Your Honor.

MR. ANDERSON:

I think they just started off on

different tracks because they were arrested at different times
or something.
THE COURT:

For some reason and it's never been

satisfactorily explained to me, every defendant gets charged
with and is placed in a different file with a different number
even though it may be the same information and I don't
understand why that administratively has to happen but it's
foolish because you get cases that should be together that
appear on the surface to be separated and they might go to
different judges. But anyway, the long and the short of it is
these cases ought to be together unless there's some legitimate
reason not to try them together and I would certainly entertain
that.

So, here's what I'm going to do.

these cases be consolidated.

I'm going to order

They come out of the same event,

they came out of the same alleged criminal episode and at least
at this point in time, it doesn't appear to be an prejudice to
either one of the defendants by combining these cases. That
doesn't mean I will not entertain a motion to separate these
cases on reflection if counsel thinks that's necessary.
So, would you get my calendar please?
Two-day trial I assume.
27

1

MR. ANDERSON:

Yeah-

No more than that.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. ANDERSON:

4

THE COURT: Well, how about the 26th of November?

Anybody in a big hurry to try this?
No, Your Honor.

5

Let's go to the 28th and the 29th.

6

MR. FINLAYSON:

Your Honor, I have a trial the 26th,

7

27th and 28th with Judge Lewis that I'm pretty confident is

8

going to go.

9

THE COURT:

10

How about the 5th of December?

MR. FINLAYSON:

I have a jury trial then with Judge

11

Skanchy.

I'm not sure if that one is going or not but I do

12

have one set for the 5th and the 6th.

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

10th of December?

14

MR. FINLAYSON:

15

MR. ANDERSON:

16

THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, this is your case?

17

MS. TAYLOR:

18

THE COURT: All right.

That would be fine.
That's fine.

Uh-huh (affirmative).
10th of December, two days,

19

10th and 11th, We start at ten o'clock with a jury. We'll

20

need counsel here at 9:30.

21

trial.

22

regular criminal motion calendar.

23

I'll consider it then and if there's any special voir dire that

24

I need to concern myself with, I'll expect to have that also b^

25

the 7th.

Instructions first morning of

Final pretrial on December 7, nine o'clock on my
If there's a resolution,

If there is a resolution between the parties before
28

1

that date, I have no objection to your calling my clerk and

2

having her put it on the calendar on an earlier Friday.

3

Otherwise I'll see you on the 7th.

4

MR. FINLAYSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

8
9
0
1

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0
1

3
4
5

Thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you counsel. We'll be in recess
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or:

?: J

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-v -

Case No 011905094
LIZA CORWELL,
Hon Timothy R Hanson
Defendant
This matter came on for a Motion to Suppress hearing on September 19, 2001,
before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District Court Judge, presiding
The State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Lana Taylor The Defendant was
present and represented by Patrick L Anderson Evidence was presented in the form of
testimony from Detective Troy Anderson The Court, based upon the evidence and
argument presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted by counsel, and
for good cause shown, makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1

On March 13, 2001, Salt Lake City Detective Troy Anderson and other

officers investigated a report that Defendant Corwell was involved in using or selling
illegal drugs in a motel room, located at 1990 West North Temple, in Salt Lake County

1

2.

The officers knocked on the door of the motel room and asked if

defendant Corwell was present.
3.

Defendant Champneys spoke to the officers through the door and said that

Corwell was not there.
4.

Detective Anderson could see into the room through the window and saw

both Defendants Champneys and Corwell.
5.

Defendant Corwell then told the officers that she was in the room.

6.

The officers identified themselves and asked if they could enter the room

7.

Through the window, Detective Anderson saw Defendant Corwell put

what appeared to be a black crack pipe into a purse, which was on the bed. Corwell then
put the purse behind the bed. Both defendants were running around the room, putting
items into bags and under the bed and making several trips to the bathroom.
8.

The officers asked the defendants to open the door, and the defendants

9.

The officer told the defendants that if they did not open the door, they

refused.

would have to force the door open and the defendants again refused to open the door
10.

One of the officers received a key to the room from the manager of the

motel, who said that he wanted the defendants "kicked out."
11.

The officers tried to use the key to enter the room, but the door was dead-

12.

The officers kicked the door in and arrested the defendants for interfering

bolted.

with a police investigation.

2

13

Defendants Champneys and Corwell were searched and officers found the

evidence m this case, which consisted of cocaine and drug paraphernalia
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The officers had probable cause to believe that drug activity was occurring

in the room as a result of the information they were provided and the facts, which
confirmed that information
2

The officers had exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into

the motel room as a result of the defendants' actions, which indicated that they were
concealing and destroying evidence
3.

The evidence in this case was lawfully seized pursuant to the probable

cause and exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment
DATED this

ly of

2001
BY ykE COURT

ISTRICT JUDGE
ApfTr^ved as to Form

Patrick L Anderson
Attorney for the Defendant

3

DAVID E YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No 7642
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801)363-7900
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
-v -

Case No 011905094
LIZA CORWELL,
Hon Timothy R Hanson
Defendant
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is
denied
DATED this

day of.
BY THE COURT

ISTRICT JUDGE
Approved as to Form

Patrick L Anderson
Attorney for the Defendant

Addendum D

STATE OF UTAH V. REBECCA CHAMPNEYS
Charge: Tampering with Evidence 2°
Case No. 011905093FS
Preliminary Hearing Date: June 19,2001
Judge: Robin W. Reese
Attorney for Plaintiff (ATP): Lana Taylor
Attorney for Defendant (ATD): David Finlayson

1

J:

Mr. Finlayson, do you have a copy of the information?

2

ATD: I do Your honor. We would waive reading of that.

3

J:

4

ATP: The State would call Detective Troy Anderson to the stand.

5

J:

6

Clerk: Raise your right hand please. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to

The State call it's witness please.

Come forward please.

7

give in this case now before the Court shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

8

truth, so help you God?

9
10

W:

I do.

Clerk: Sit here please.

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF STATE'S WITNESS #1 - TROY ANDERSON

12

ATP: Please state your full name and spell your last name for the record.

13

W:

14

ATP: Where are you currently employed?

15

W:

It's Troy Anderson. A-N-D-E-R-S-O-N.

Salt Lake City Police Department in Narcotics Division.

State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs
Tampering with Witness 2°

1

Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001
Case No. 011905093FS

1

ATP: And were you so employed in March of this year?

2

W:

3

ATP: Did you have occasion to go to the address of 1990 North Temple. I guess it was Motel 6

I was.

on March 13th of 2000?

4
5

W:

6

ATP: Is that within Salt Lake City?

7

W:

8

ATP: And why were you there?

9

W:

10

I did.

It is.

We had an (inaudible) that the occupants of the room there were engaging in illegal use
selling of narcotics.

11

ATP: Did you have any other individuals - officers with you?

12

W:

13

ATP: How many?

14

W:

15

ATP: And what did you do at the Motel 6?

16

W:

17

I did.

I believe there were four or five of us.

We had information that the occupants we were looking for are Lisa and Rebecca were in
room 236. We went to that room number and conducted a knock and talk.

18

ATP: Can you please describe what you did that the door?

19

W:

Yeah. My self and Detective Ita went to the room, knocked on the door. A female asked who

20

it was. Detective Ita said it was Tracy. The female asked who. Again, he said it was Tracy

21

and then he said that it was Detective Ita with Salt Lake City Police Department. She asked
State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs
Tampering with Witness 2°

2

Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001
Case No. 011905093FS

1

us to see a badge. I could see her through a window - a crack in the - between the curtains

2

and the window, I could see into the window. She asked to see a badge. Detective Ita held

3

his badge up to the door. I held my badge up to the window. I could see her look at my

4

badge.

5

ATP: What happened next?

6

W:

We told her why we were there.

7

J:

Told who? Who's "her?"

8

W:

I'm sorry. The individual at the door. Later known to me as Rebecca.

9

ATP: And is that individual present here in the room?

0

W:

1

ATP: Thank you. The State would ask that the record reflect identification.

2

J:

3

ATP: I believe you stated that the officers identified themselves and their purpose. Was that - at

4

She is. She's the individual sitting here.

It will.

that time, were you speaking with the defendant?

5

W:

I was.

5

ATP: And what was her response?

7

W:

I could see - as I'm looking into the window, I could see -1 asked her if -1 told her we were

3

looking for an individual named Liza. She told me that Liza wasn't there and that she was

?

alone. At that point, I could see another female individual in the hotel room. And I saw her

)

at that point, put something into a black bag - a purse-type bag. At the time, I thought it was

I

a - what appeared to me to be a crack pipe or a pipe to smoke narcotics.

State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs
Tampering with Witness 2°

3
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1

ATP: What did you do after you saw that?

2

W:

At that point, I told Detective James Tracy what I'd seen. He told me that he'd go down to

3

talk to the management to see if he could get a key to the hotel room. I continued to talk to

4

Rebecca and told her that I could see that they were hiding what I thought was evidence and

5

I told her to open the door. She refused.

6

ATP: At that time, did you see any other activity at which caused you concern?

7

W:

Yeah. At that point, both individuals were running around the room. They were -1 could

8

see them going under the bed - or behind and sort of under the bed. There's two beds in the -

9

I can't remember -1 think it was one big bed, but they were going to the far side of the bed

10

underneath the bed. They were going in and out of the bathroom. They went in and out of

11

the bathroom probably two or three times each.

12

ATP: Did Detective Tracy get a key to the room?

13

W:

He did. He returned and told me that hotel management had given him a key and had told

14

him that if there was anything illegal going on in the room that they were evicted. That they

15

were no longer welcome at the hotel/motel.

16

ATP: And did the key work?

17

W:

18

ATP: And were you able to gain access to the room?

19

W:

It worked, but the door wouldn't open. They had the deadbolt locked.

Yes. I told Rebecca to open the door. She again refused. At that point, Detective James

20

Tracy kicked the door. One of the occupants yelled that they would open it about halfway

21

through James second kick which breached the door and the door opened.
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1

ATP: What did you see when you went in the room?

2

W:

3

I saw the defendant Rebecca and I immediately engaged her; I placed her in a twist lock and
put - they're called flex cuffs or like a plastic - they look like a zip tie-type handcuff on her.

4

ATP: Was she under arrest at that time?

5

W:

6

ATP: What for?

7

W:

8

ATP: What did you do next?

9

W:

0

She was.

Interfering.

At that point, the other detectives maintained custody or gained custody or control of the
other individual. I started to search the defendant Rebecca.

1

ATP: Did youfindanything?

2

W:

I did. In her rear pocket on the right side, I found a metallic pipe, what appeared to me to be

3

a pipe or cocaine or crack pipe. It was burned on one end. It had a screen on the other end.

4

I asked her what it was and she told me that it was a pipe that she used to smoke cocaine.

5

ATP: And did you search her any further?

6

W:

At that point, she became extremely hostile. She was screaming that she wanted a female

7

officer to search her. I told her that that wasn't possible, that I knew how to search an

8

individual and to just let me do my job. Shortly thereafter, I mean, within seconds, I was

9

told by - I'm not sure which detective, but I was told that we did have a female officer that

0

was available and was in route. So at that time, I stopped searching the individual.

1

ATP: Did the female officer search the defendant?
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1

W:

2

ATP: And prior to that, did the defendant make any statements about any further search?

3

W:

4

ATP: Did she say where?

5

W:

6

ATP: What did Officer Robertsfindwhen she searched - what did shefindwhen she searched the

7
8

She did. Officer Patty Roberts arrived and searched both individuals.

Yeah, she told me that - at that point, that she had cocaine on her.

I don't recall.

defendant?
W:

She found several items. I believe she found two items in her bra. One was a twist or a

9

baggie of cocaine, which was tested and tested positive for cocaine. That'sfieldtested. She

10

also found a contact case and I believe it had some cotton - some like old cotton inside ofnt.

11

She also found I believe, in the individuals pants a spoon with residue on it - white residue.

12

She also found I think, some kleenex and like a brillo -1 think a burnt brillo pad of some sort

13

in her pants as well.

14

ATP: And the cocaine in the contact case. Where were those found?

15

W:

16

ATP: And you stated those were - that substance was field-tested?

17

W:

18
19

I believe. It wasfield-testedat the time and it tested positive. I believe it was sent to the lab
as well.

ATP: I'm going to have marked State's Exhibit #1. I ask that you take a look at that. Do you

20
21

Those were in her bra I believe.

recognize what that is?
W:

Yeah.
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ATD: We'll stipulate to it. It's just the tox report.
W:

Tox report, yeah.

J:

Okay, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 - the tox report will be received.

ATP: And was the substance which was found on the defendant, did that test positive for cocaine
at the lab?
W:

Yes, it looks like it did.

ATP: What occurred after Officer Roberts found the items?
W:

She searched the individuals inside the bathroom and I could hear -1 could hear a commotion
when she searched the defendant. I asked if she was alright. She said yes. The two came
out of the bathroom shortly thereafter. The bathroom - they were in the bathroom with the
door closed, so I could hear what was happening but couldn't see what was happening.
When they came out, I asked Officer Roberts what had happened. She told me that the
individual had attempted toflushthe cocaine.

ATP: Do you - did you have anymore specifics about how the defendant attempted to do that?
W:

I believe what occurred is she had - as Officer Roberts had found the evidence, she had set
it on the bathroom counter that was in the room. At some point, as Officer Roberts was
continuing to search, the defendant had grabbed the cocaine off of the counter. (Inaudible).

ATP: (Inaudible).
W:

I'm sorry.

ATP: I'm sorry. Finish your....
W:

Where a struggle had - somewhat of a struggle had ensued and Rebecca had the cocaine in
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1

her hand.

2

ATP: Did Deputy Roberts ever ask the defendant about the twist being missing?

3

W:

4

ATP: Would that help you refresh your recollection?

5

W:

6

ATP: Please.

7

W:

8
9

If I could refer to her report?

It would.

It says in her report that she asked what happened to the twist and that Becky stated that she
thought it'd fallen down the bathroom drain.

ATP: And was that twist ever recovered?

10

W:

It was. Officer Roberts found it in Becky's hand.

11

ATP: I have no further questions.

12

CROSS EXAMINATION OF STATE'S WITNESS #1 - TROY ANDERSON

13

ATD: I got a couple questions about this tox report. This tox report has Tl and T2 on it. And I

14

don't know - can you tell me - it's got both defendant's on here. Rebecca Champneys and

15

Liza Victoria Corwell - are both suspects? How do we know whichi one goes to who or what

16

these were?

17

W:

I don't know.

18

ATD: Okay.

19

W:

20

ATD: So you know that some of the stuff was recovered from both people, right?

I know that...
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1

W:

2

ATD: Alright. But we don't know from this who Tl or T2 goes to?

3

W:

4

ATD: Do you know all the stuff that recovered from both? Or did some - did some officers recover

5

Correct.

I don't.

stuff from Liza, some officers recovered stuff from Rebecca?

6

W:

I believe Officer - well, I know Officer Roberts - Patty Roberts searched both females.

7

ATD: Searched both? Did you see her search?

8

W:

9

ATD: Okay, so you don't have any personal knowledge of this search?

0

W:

1

ATD: You were just told that there was things found on them?

No, I was in the room, but she was in the bathroom with the door closed.

That's correct.

L2

W:

That's correct.

3

ATD: You didn't bag this stuff or take it to the evidence room or anything like that?

14

W:

15

ATD: Okay. Alright, let me ask you a couple questions. I actually just have a couple quick

16

questions. You said that there was some information you were looking for Liza?

I don't believe I took care of the evidence, no.

17

W:

Yes.

i8

ATD: And why were you looking for Liza?

19

W:

The intelligence report that Detective Ita had received was that a female named Liza and I

10

believe he had her last name as well, but I don't know for certain was with another individual

11

at the Motel 6 in that motel room and that they were engaging in illegal activity - either using
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1

or selling narcotics.

2

ATD: Either using or selling narcotics? But you didn't have any specifics?

3

W:

4

ATD: That's all you had? That these two people were either using or selling narcotic?

5

W:

6

ATD: Did you know who that came from?

7

W:

8

ATD: Did you know at the time?

9

W:

I'm not sure I understand your question.

Yeah, that a female named Liza is with another female in that room, yes.

I do.

Yes.

10

ATD: Okay, who did that come from?

11

W:

12

ATD: Liza's husband? So Liza's husband calls and says Liza and some other female are using or

13

It came from -1 believe it was Liza's husband.

selling narcotics?

14

W:

15

ATD: Okay, now you didn't get a warrant?

16

W:

17

ATD: You go down there and then you have this intelligence report. Is that on the report form or

18
19
20
21

He' d been talking to her on the phone.

No.

does it just come infromdispatch or what?
W:

Usually it's a telephonic report. An individual that volunteered or whoever answers the
phone documents everything, handwritten reports like this.

ATD: So somebody just calls up and says "I'm Liza's husband." Is that....
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1

W:

2

ATD: But that person wasn't - you didn't know that person's down at the police station swearing

3

I didn't take the call, so I don't know.

out a statement or anything.

4

W:

Ask the question again. I'm sorry.

5

ATD: You don't know whether the person's down at the police station. You don't know whether

6

the person called in. You just get some information telephonically that this information is

7

out there?

8

W:

9

ATD: Okay. So you're going over there to follow up on it?

0

W:

1

ATD: And when you say a "knock and talk" in your report, you don't have a warrant, right?

2

W:

3

ATD: You're just going to knock on the door and talk to these people?

4

W:

5

ATD: Now, you wrote in the report and you said - you got your report there?

6

W:

7

ATD: You say, "I saw Liza place what appeared to be a metallic object into a black purse that was

8

That's correct.

That's correct.

That's right.

That's correct.

I do.

on the bed," right?

9

W:

Yes.

0

ATD: Then the object looked to be the right shape and size of a crack pipe?

1

W:

That's correct.
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1

ATD: You couldn't tell it was a crack pipe? It just looked therightsize and shape?

2

W:

3

ATD: Metallic object. You were looking through the crack of the window?

4

W:

5

It looked like - yeah, it looked like a crack pipe to me.

I'm looking through the window with the drapes open. Probably a three to four inch gap in
the window.

6

ATD: And was it dark? Light?

7

W:

8

ATD: Light outside? I can't remember what time this is.

9

W:

Light.

I don't remember what outside looked like. I know the motel room was well lit.

10

ATD: But is it dark or light outside?

11

W:

12

ATD: Are you inside a motel? Or are you - actually outside? Are you inside of a hotel area or are

13

I don't recall.

you actually outside in the air?

14

W:

15

ATD: Okay. But you don't put in your report it looks like a crack pipe? You say it looks like the

16

We're outside in the air.

right shape and size of a crack pipe, right?

17

W:

Yeah. It's what I believed to be a crack pipe?

18

ATD: And how far away is Liza when you see this?

19

W:

20

ATD: How big? At least your finger? Your indexfinger?How big is the object?

21

W:

Five to ten feet

Bigger than my finger.
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1

ATD: Okay. Now then you bust in,right?You guys bust in when you tell these guys what's going

2

on? You go to get the key,right?The key doesn't work and the key doesn't open it because

3

the bolts locked, right?

4

W:

Correct.

5

ATD: And so you kick the door in?

6

W:

7

ATD: You said they're going back and forth in the bathroom?

8

W:

9

ATD: Did you everfindout what they're doing in the bathroom?

0

W:

1

ATD: That's all the questions I have, Your honor.

2

J:

3

ATP: Just a couple things.

Correct.

Yes.

No.

Any others?

$

REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF STATE'S WITNESS #1 - TROY ANDERSON

5

ATP: In your review of the report, how many - how many packages of controlled substance were

6

found in the entire event?

7

W:

How many packages of controlled substance?

8

ATP: Um hmm (affirmative).

9

W:

0

ATP: And was one item found on each individual?

I believe there was two.
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1

W:

2

ATP: Alright, so the information in the toxicology report also reflects that there were two items,

3

To the best of my knowledge, yes.

isn't that right?

4

ATD: Judge, I'm going to object to that and ask that it be stricken. I think he's already testified

5

that he didn't observe the search and he doesn't actually know. And I don't know if we have

6

another officer here, but he didn't observe the search, so he doesn't know what was taken or

7

how many. I think that's what he just testified to.

8

J:

He said he wasn't present (inaudible).

9

ATP: And Your honor, Rule 1102 allows this officer to testify from the reports of other officers -

10

his fellow officers and I think that's information that he's presented that he reviewed her

11

report and according to the report, that she was searched and she found the substance in her

12

bra.

13

J:

14

ATD: I think it allows them to testify to whether or not the officer observed and told them. I think

15

she'srightabout that. I'd object as Hearsay, but I understand that the rulings of the Court's

16

have made. But if that's -1 guess my objection's on foundation. If that's - if that's what he's

17

testifying to, then I'd object on foundation. I need a little more - I'd need to know where,

18

what he's talking about or what specifically she said to him.

19

J:

Counsel? Something else?

Okay, well let's limit to that first. What did this officer tell you - the other officer, Roberts

20

about what she found on Ms. Champneys and what she found on the other person was

21

Corwell.
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W:

Again, on Rebecca, she told me that she found in her bra, she found a twist of what she
thought was cocaine which was field-tested as cocaine. She found a contact case that was
missing one of the two lids. Inside the other closed portion, was a dried up tissue. She found
in her pants a spoon...

J:

And "her" meaning...?

W:

In Rebecca's pants she found a spoon, a brillo pad with I believe it had burn marks on it.
And some more tissue. On Liza's person, she found I believe another rock I think, of
cocaine. And she also found some paraphernalia and I'm not -1 could refer to the report.
I'm not sure specifically what was - what the paraphernalia on her was.

ATP: Does that lay specific foundation?
J:

Well, I don't know. Ask the next question. We'll see if there's an objection.

ATP: To your knowledge, eitherfromwhat the other officers have told you, orfromyour review
of the report made in this matter by yourself and your fellow officers, to your knowledge, is
there - were there any other items of actual controlled substance that were located other than
the twist that you've mentioned that was found on the defendant and the twist that was found
on Liza?
W:

No.

ATP: And to your knowledgefromyour review of the reports and talking to your fellow officers,
were both of those two items sent to the State Lab?
W:

I believe they were.

ATP: And in your view of the reports as well as looking as State's Exhibit #1, do those appear t
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1

be the two items of controlled substances that were found on Rebecca and on Liza?

2

W:

Yes, T1 appears to be a white powdery - or a white powder and T2 appears to be white rock.

3

ATP: I have no further questions.

4

ATD: I don't have any other questions, Your honor.

5

J:

Okay, you can (inaudible).

6

W:

Thank you, Your honor.

7

J:

The State rests?

8

ATP: Yes, your honor.

9

J:

Ms. Champneys, is she going to testify or call witnesses todays

10

ATD: Your honor, I would advise her - we don't have any witnesses. I'd advise her to reserve Ifer

11

right to testify at trial and I think she'll follow my advice. She shakes her head yes.

12

J:

She does. Thank you. Did either of you have anything else to say at this point?

13

CLOSING ARGUMENTS

14

ATD: I just have a brief argument, Your honor. I'm not sure that I know exactly what the State's

15

theory is on the tampering with evidence, but I don't think that it's made out by -1 don't

16

have any arguments on Count II and III, but on the tampering with evidence I don't think it's

17

made out by hiding it on yourself. I don't think that can be altered or destroyed concealing

18

or moving to impair severity or availability there. They're in there, they're coming in and

19

they've got him there, so I don't think concealing on your own person meets that

20

requirement. I don't think there was testimony that they verified anything was flushed down
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1

the toilet, which is what I thought the theory was but I don't think there's been testimony to

2

that.

3

J:

What about this part. I agree with you certainly as to initially the concealment in the - the

4

alleged concealment by Ms. Champneys, but what about - as I gathered, there was this

5

officer that searched Ms. Champneys, took the twist of cocaine and set it on the counter in

6

the bathroom. Then Ms. Champneys took it. That was what I thought the officer said,

7

anyway. There was a struggle for it and then the officer asked Ms. Champneys "what did

8

you do with it?" or "where is it?" something to that effect. Ms. Champneys said, "Well, I

9

think it fell down the sink." But later it was discovered in her hand. If that was the evidence,

0

would that constitute the concealment in your judgment?

1

ATD: Well, I suppose that -1 mean, I don't remember exactly how the testimony went. There was

2

a struggle and she thought it went down the sink, but didn't turn out to have gone down the

3

sink. I don't know that that shows intent to conceal. It shows she thought it might have gone

4

somewhere and it didn't. It didn't say - the testimony wasn't that she said, "I tried to throw

5

it down the sink," or "I tried to get rid of it," or "sorry I threw it down the sink I think it went

6

down the sink," and setting it on the counter certainly isn't concealing. I just don't think it -

7

I mean, I know it doesn't take much to get it past prelim, but I don't think that there's

8

anything specifically that goes to her intent to conceal it for that purpose.

9

J:

0

ATP: Yes, Your honor. As I recall the testimony, the officer laid the item on the sink as she

1

Okay. Did you want to say anything counsel?

continued to search then the items no longer were on the sink or on the basin, she asked Ms.
State of Utah v. Rebecca Champnevs
Tampering with Witness 2°

17

Preliminary Hearing - June 19, 2001
Case No. 011905093FS

1

Champneys, "where is it?" and she says, "Well, I think it must've fallen down the drain/'

2

hoping, I think, you can infer, that "Oh, it's gone. Oh, it's too late." When in fact, it was in

3

her hand the whole time. She knew it was in her hand because the officer found it there in

4

her hand. And that she told the officer something different, trying to conceal it.

5

J:

Anything else, Mr. Finlayson?

6

ATD: No.

7

J:

If the jury chose to believe those facts, Ms. Champneys, and counsel, I believe that they

8

could find you guilty of this offense based on this evidence that you picked it up after the

9

officer had set it on the counter allegedly at least. There was a stnjggle when it might have

10

fallen down the sink and you thought - you told the officer you thought it had, but in fagt,

11

you were concealing it in your hand. It would meet the definition technically speaking at

12

least, as I understand it. If in fact, it was your intent to hide it in your hand and mislead the

13

officers in thinking that maybe it had gone down the sink. I'll deny the motion to dismiss

14

Count I. I find there's sufficient evidence to support all three charges, enter a not guilty plea,

15

and have this matter set before one of the other judges of this Court for a scheduling

16

conference.

17

Case bound over.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; DECEMBER 7, 2001

2

HONORABLE JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. FINLAYSON:

6

co-defendant.

7

that's resolved.

8

Champneys.

9
10

Mr. Finlayson?

We can handle that.

THE COURT:
Ms. Corwell?

12

MR. ANDERSON:

Right.
Yes.

Ms. Corwell is standing beside

me.

14

THE COURT:

And I assume Ms. Champneys is here.

Here

she is.

16

MR. FINLAYSON:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. FINLAYSON:

19

It's No. 9, Rebecca

Oh, yes and I believe Mr. Anderson has

MR. FINLAYSON:

15

We have a

Mr. Anderson and I have a co-defendant case

11

13

Good morning Your Honor.

She is, Your Honor.

Okay.
Your Honor, there is two files for

Champneys.

20

MR. ANDERSON:

21

THE COURT:

If I may approach Your Honor?

Uh-huh (affirmative).
All right.

Oh, yes, I was

22

about to ask for that.

The matters before me are

23

State of Utah vs. Rebecca Champneys Case #011905093 and State

24

of Utah vs. Lisa Corwell, #011905094.

25

consolidated and set for trial on Monday next and it looks like

These matters were

1

both the defendants are present and so where are we today?

2

MR. FINLAYSON:

Your Honor, let me ask you, sometimes

3

the wheels move faster than you think they are going to but I

4

got a call from West Valley that they were going to send a case

5

over on Rebecca from West Valley and I think Evelyn called.

6

COURT CLERK: Murray.

7

MR. FINLAYSON:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. FINLAYSON:

Was it Murray?

I got something from Murray.
I guess because they found out we

10

were going to resolve these, they sent it over and we have a

11

resolution on that case is you'd like to do it today as well?

12

THE COURT:

They just thought I needed a little more

13

work?

14

I'll take the case as long as there's a resolution.

15

Now, if I sent one to Murray there would be hell to pay.

MR. FINLAYSON:

My understanding, Your Honor, is that

16

both Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell are going to plead guilty to

17

a third degree attempt at tampering with evidence and we have,

18

it would be a plea under State vs. Sery, reserving their right

19

to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.

20
21
22

MR. LEMCKE:

That is the State's understanding, Your

Honor.
MR. FINLAYSON:

And then for Ms. Champneys she's also

23

going to plead guilty to a an attempt on Count 1 of the case

24

ending in #0772 to a Class A.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

Let me see if I have this right.
2

1

MR. FINLAYSON:

2

THE COURT:

3

Mr. Corwell is going to plead to

attempted tampering, a third, Mr. Anderson, is that right?

4

MR. ANDERSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ANDERSON:

7

Yes, Your Honor.

And Counts 2 and 3 dismissed?
That's correct.

And again Your Honor

the State agreed (inaudible) State vs. Sery.

8
9

Right.

THE COURT:

Which, so everybody is clear on that,

means you can appeal it.

10

MR. ANDERSON:

11

THE COURT:

That's correct.

I don't have any objection to that.

I

12

always encourage appellate review on any decisions I may make.

13

Okay.

Statements have been prepared for both these ladies?

14

MR. ANDERSON:

15

MR. FINLAYSON:

16

THE COURT:

17

Yes, Your Honor.
Yes.

And have you both reviewed them with your

respective clients?

18

MR. FINLAYSON:

19

MR. ANDERSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. ANDERSON:

22

THE COURT:

I have, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.

Do you believe they understand them?
Yes.

Ms. Champneys, let me ask you a couple of

23

questions and then I'm going to ask you and Ms. Corwell some

24

questions together but as far as you're concerned, Ms.

25

Champneys, you have read through the document that Mr.
4

1

Fmlayson has there for your signature ultimately here toda>?

2

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

3

THE COURT:

4

Yes, I have.

And did you have plenty of time to

discuss the matters contained in that document with him?

5

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

6

THE COURT:

I did.

The reason I ask that is, I don't anybody

7

to be rushed because the decisions we're making here today are

8

important decisions as far as you're concerned and I don't want

9

you giving up any rights that you may have without the full

10

opportunity to consider those.

11

that?

12

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

13

THE COURT:

Do you believe you've done

I believe I have, yes.

Ms. Corwell, same question.

Have you

14

reviewed the statement that Mr. Anderson has there for you?

15

Have you had plenty of time to do that?

16

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

17

THE COURT:

18

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

Do you believe you understand it?
Yes.

Do you also understand the importance of

20

the rights that you give up by pleading guilty that are

21

contained in that document?

22

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

23

THE COURT:

(inaudible).

You both understand that when a person

24

pLeads guilty to a Third Degree Felony that the potential

25

maximum sentence is a term in the Utah State Prison that can be
5

1
2

as long as five years and a fine that can be as high as $5,0?C.
You both understand that?

3

DEFENDANT CORNELL:

(inaudible).

4

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. ANDERSON:

7

THE COURT:

(inaudible).

Answer out loud please.
Answer out loud.

Ms. Champneys as far as you're concerned,

8

there's a Class A Misdemeanor in this Murray case, attempted

9

forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor carries a potential of a year in

10

the county jail and a fine as high as $2,500.

11

understand that's a possibility on the Class A Misdemeanor?

12

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

13

THE COURT:

14

Do you

I do.

Does the statement cover both of these

cases on the same document?

15

MR. FINLAYSON:

16

THE COURT:

It does, Your Honor.

Okay.

And Mr. Champneys, you understand

17

that if I thought it was necessary to incarcerate you on both

18

these cases, at the State Prison, I could make the sentences

19

run consecutively.

In other words, when you finished one, the

20

other would start.

Do you understand that's always a

21

possibility?

22

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

23

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirmative)

Now, what's going to happen in sentencing

24

I don't know.

I haven't made up my mind on this.

I haven't

25

even given it any thought at all, I don't know (inaudible) and
6

1

I won't make up my mind until I'm here on the sentencing day

2

and I've read the pre-sentence reports and I have the benefit

3

of what the two of you say and what your attorneys have to say

4

and what the State's attorney has to say.

5

making that decision.

That's when I'll be

Both of you understand that?

6

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

7

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

8

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirmative).
(Nods head in the affirmative).

Now, if you give up your right to have a

9

trial which is scheduled next Monday, do you both understand

10

that you give up an important and significant constitutional

11

and statutory rights as outlined in the paper you both read?

12

Do you both understand that?

13

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

14

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

15

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirmative).
(Nods head in the affirmative).

I want you also to understand that some

16

of those rights I want to talk with you about today, just to

17

make sure that I'm satisfied you're clear.

18

guilty, there's no trial next Monday.

19

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

20

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

21

THE COURT:

22

If you plead

Do you understand that?

(Nods head in the affirmative).
(Nods head in the affirmative).

Do you want to give up

your right to

have a trial next Monday?

23

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

24

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

25

THE COURT:

If there's no trial then you don't get to
7

1

testify because there won't be anybody to testify to.

If we

2

did try this case, both of you, if you chose, wouldn't have to,

3

but if you chose, could testify and tell the jury what occarrea

4

or did not occur in connection with these cases.

5

understand you're giving up that right?

Do you both

6

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative^ .

7

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

8

THE COURT:

9

Also, I want you to understand that if

you plead guilty, you are giving up you right to confront your

10

accusers and what that means is the people that would be called

11

by the State in an attempt to convince a jury that you

12

committed this crime you're charged with.

13

have the right to cross examine them and test their credibility

14

and point out any inconsistencies in their testimony and you

15

won't get to see them here in the courtroom.

16

understand you're giving up that right?

Your attorney won't

Do you both

17

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

18

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

19

THE COURT:

Both of you at this point in time, are

20

presumed innocent.

As far as I'm concerned, you did not commit

21

these crimes and that won't change ^ntil you tell different if

22

you do here today.

23

the jury to think the same way.

24

sit on the jury unless they agreed that they would start the

25

case on Monday with the two of you presuming that you were both

But if we tried this case, I would require
In other words, they could not

8

1

innocent and I would tell them that that presumption would nave

2

to follow this case unless and until, if the State could, prove

3

you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

4

presumption of innocense stays with you.

5

on any evidence, the verdict is not guilty because the

6

presumption of innocense assumes and presumes that you are not

7

guilty.

8

you both understand that?

9

But otherwise, the
The State doesn't put

That all goes away if you say guilty here today. Do

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

10

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

11

THE COURT:

12

Do you both want to give up your right 10

the presumption of innocense?

Both want to give that right up?

13

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

14

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

You recall that I mentioned the

16

State has to prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

17

That's a very high standard of proof and the burden of proof is

18

always on the State.

19

prove that you did not commit this crime. You can put on

20

evidence if you wanted to but you're not required to.

21

burden of proof always stays with the State and if the State

22

could not convince every member of the jury that you committed

23

these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, a high standard of

24

proof, then the jury finds you not guilty.

25

understand you're giving up that opportunity?

Neither one of you has any obligation to

The

Do you both

9

1

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative .

2

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

3

THE COURT:

Now, you both pleaded guilty on your

4

respective cases to attempted tampering with evidence.

The

5

State claims that these third degree felonies were committed at

6

1990 West North Temple here in Salt Lake County on March 13~

7

of this year and there the State claims that each one of you,

8

believing that there was an official proceeding or an

9

investigation going on, that you either altered, destroyed, or

10

attempted to alter, destroy, or conceal evidence in connection

11

with that investigation.

Is that true?

12

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

13

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. ANDERSON:

(Nods head in the affirmative).

Yes, Your Honor.

What's the factual statement here?
Your Honor, on March 13 at 1990 West

16

North Temple, after seeing police officers and having verbal

17

communications with a police officer at a hotel room

18

(inaudible) did attempt to conceal materials (inaudible).

19
20

THE COURT:

Is that correct as far as a factual

statement is concerned, Ms. Corwell:

21

MS. CORWELL: Yes.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. ANDERSON:

24
25

Same thing for Ms. Champneys?
Yes, Your Honor, Ms. Champneys was

with Ms. Corwell.
THE COURT:

Are those the facts here, Ms. Champneys?
10

1

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

2

THE COURT:

(Nods head in the affirnati-e .

So, I'm entering your guilty pleas here

3

today. Ladies, you believe you're guilty of what: you're

4

oleading guilty to?

5

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

6

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

7

THE COURT:

8

Have either one of you consumed an

alcoholic beverages in the last 24 hours?

9

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Shakes head in the negative).

10

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Shakes head in the negative).

11

THE COURT:

12

Have either one of you taken any drugs of

any kind, prescription or otherwise?

13

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

14

THE COURT:

15

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

16

THE COURT:

17

What kind of prescription, Ms. Champneys?
I take (inaudible).

And does that effect your ability to

think clearly?

18

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

19

THE COURT:

20

I have, prescription.

No.

So do you believe you're thinking clearly

right now?

21

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

22

THE COURT:

23

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

24

THE COURT:

25

DEFENDANT CORWELL:

Yes.

Ms. Corwell, any drugs of any kind?
(Shakes head in the negative).

Do you believe you're thinking clearly?
Yes.
11

1

THE COURT:

Is there anything I've said about the

2

rights that you're giving up or what we discussed about this

3

plea arrangement that is unclear to either one of you?

4

Anything unclear?

5

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

6

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

7

THE COURT: Any questions you want to ask me before

8

you offer a guilty plea?

9

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative).

10

DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative).

11

THE COURT: Counsel, anything else either one of you

12

would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments?

13

MR. ANDERSON:

14

MR. FINLAYSON:

15

I have nothing, Your Honor.
No Your Honor, we do have the Class A

on Ms. Champneys too.

16

THE COURT:

Oh yeah.

17

MR. ANDERSON:

I can provide a factual basis for

On July 18th at 2120 South State, Ms. Champneys

18

that.

19

attempted to utter writing a check, pass a check purporting to

20

be acting with another to do fraud and that she had reason to

21

believe the check was a bad check.

22

THE COURT:

23

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

24

THE COURT:

25

Is that correct, Ms. Champneys?
Yes.

That's what happened on July 18th, you

tried to pass a bad check?
12

1

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes.

2

THE COURT:

3

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes.

4

THE COURT:

5

Class A Misdemeanor?

You knew it was not a good check?

So do you believe you're guilty of that

6

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

7

THE COURT:

8
9
10
11
12
13

Yes, I do.

Mr. Lemcke, anything else on the Rule A

requirements?
MR. LEMCKE:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
You may sign the statement, ladies, if

you choose to at this point in time.
MR. FINLAYSON:

The (inaudible) have been signed,

Your Honor.

14

MR. ANDERSON:

May we approach, Your Honor?

15

THE COURT:

Please.

16

All right.

Ms. Champneys, for the record then to the

17

attempted tampering of evidence, a third degree felony charge,

18

claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt

19

Lake County on March 13th, 2001, is charged in the case ending

20

5093, how do you plead?

21

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

22

THE COURT:

Guilty.

Turning to the second case 0011918743,

23

the one that came in from Murray, you are charged with

24

attempted forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor, claimed to have

25

occurred at 2120 South State Street here in Salt: Lake County on
13

1

July 18

of 2001, how do you plead?

2

DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS:

3

THE COURT:

Guilty.

The record will show that I reviewed tne

4

statement and along with the discussions I've had with Ms.

5

Champneys, I believe that her pleas are properly given and

6

knowingly given.

7

gives up and also the potential consequences and therefore I've

8

signed the statement and I accept the two pleas.

9
10

I think she understands her rights that she

I assume the State's motions then to dismiss Count 2
and 3 in 5093?

11

MR. LEMCKE:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. LEMCKE:

14

THE COURT:

The State does, Your Honor.
And Count 2 in 8743?
The State does, Your Honor.
Now, Ms. Corwell, you're charged now with

15

attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony,

16

claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt

17

Lake County on March 13th of 2001. On that charge, how do you

18

plead?

19

MS. CORWELL:

20

THE COURT:

21

Guilty.

Guilty?

The State's motion to dismiss

Counts 2 and 3?

22

MR. LEMCKE:

23

THE COURT:

It is, Your Honor.
So ordered.

I've signed the statement

24

that Ms. Corwell has executed . I believe there's a factual

25

basis for the guilty plea and I also believe that she
14

1

understands the rights that she gives up and the potential

2

consequences and has voluntarily entered her plea.

3

Okay.

Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, having pled

4

guilty to a third degree felony and a Class A Misdemeanor and a

5

third degree felony, I advise you that you have the right to be

6

sentenced not earlier than two nor more than 45 days from

7

today's date.

8
9

I assume you want pre-sentence reports on both these
ladies?

10

MR. ANDERSON:

11

MR. FINLAYSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. ANDERSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. FINLAYSON:

16

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Yes.

February 1st?
That's fine, Your Honor.

Mr. Finlayson?
That's fine, Judge.

I'll set the, I'll refer these matter to

17

the Adult Probation and Parole for preparation of a pre-

18

sentence report.

19

Sentencing set for September 1st at 9:00.

Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, I'm going to give you

20

a referral to Adult Probation and Parole.

The first order of

21

business is to be in contact with them.

22

of the holiday period coming up, the time frame for getting

23

pre-sentence reports done is lessened.

24

office less than they usually are.

25

them.

Do not delay.

Because

People are in the

Do not fail to contact

Do not fail to follow through on the pre-sentence
15

1

report.

2

don't have a pre-sentence report because you haven't made any

3

effort to do it then I sentence you without it and you don't

4

want me to do that. You've seen what happens today.

5

this a priority to get the pre-sentence report done.

6

be to your advantage.

7

to the Court's finding as you've both signed off on the form on

8

the findings of facts and conclusion?

9

If that occurs and you get here on February 1

So, make
It will

While I recognize there's an objection

MR. ANDERSON:

10

MR. FINLAYSON:

11

THE COURT:

12

ana I

Yes, Your Honor.
Yes, Judge.

I will sign those now including the order

in both cases and I will see you all on the 1st of February.

13

MR. FINLAYSON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

14

MR. ANDERSON:

15

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Thank you, Your Honor.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(C)

16
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Addendum F

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE • •—,If

SALT LAKE COIJNTY
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AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

OdS^M.1
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PROVISION
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'
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r ' ma i c i

PUNISHMENT
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

SEGRSE

A.
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<•-'* /"* i

I cL*

y

h

f\

.

-,, f ^ /„>

J
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-2I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have
read it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense (s)
for which I am pleading guilty.
The elements of the crime (s) of which I am charged are as
follows: Vl«t *n*

»r

*t>*,t

AarrA

fS. XV)f

*(* Hf0{/>**

farfA

>f.^uj u s,rt/sko&,,<!, .side *{fi<LL n* Jf^iJ.
V'«ffo (Utr,,r cffkhifW&Jfif

l*o**>jA^<unife*f>yt

My'conduct, and t h e conduct of o t h e r persons for wnich I am '
c r i m i n a l l y l i a b l e , t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s the elements of the crime(s)
charged i s as follows:.

nf{s ,d<J
Hi

b> r*iArP^( ***{<,>*(* T&J toy*(a \*,*«.'^

>Ac>e*.&«*{h">

I

am

entering

this/these

plea(s)

voluntarily

and with

knowledge and understanding of the following facts:
1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the Court at no cost to me.

I recognize that a

condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so
appointed for me.

-J

have not! 'have «a-\ei di i j i, counsel. If I have
waived or, rijiy * counsel i nave i; e s: tn:wm ifLy, intelligent!/
and voluntas 1 1 *
' , ^ f ! M ^ n j reasons

3
r f T h3«; waived my right to c: ur.se 1, I VJ . .ia: tv.^s
statement aril 'understand the nature an i elements of trie charges rry
rights in this case ani other proceedings and the <~:r ** -i-^c : f
my plea . f guilt/,
If 1 h^ve-nct waived m, i \ j i, i
^_-^
it attorney 13
(//[fi^R
L MAJ/^/^I^\
and 1 have hail in opportunity to fully
discuss this statement,, m, r 13h15 and the ccnsequences of m, guilty
p lei w 1> I" 1, in11 attorney,
l Hrn f'lMl' T have a right fn a trial in open :ourt by an
1mparl1.il jury, an J tmat 1 am giving up "that right by pleading
guilty.
6.
I know that If T w:„'i to tuv* a t;>ai 1 have tte r.jh
confront; arid cross-examine witnesses against me 1 ",*- have tne.n
cress-examined by my attorne,
I 315 Knew t.iat 1 vr T e t n e n g n c
to compel my witness(si by subpoena a" State expense I. testify in
court in my behalf. 1 undprqt-<n , M n 1 im giving up tnese rigncs
if I plead guilty.
7.
I know thai 1 n.tje 1 riynt to testify in m( .wn behalf
but. ,1 L Uhoose rv-r '• ) do s- 1 cannot be compelled t:; testify or
give evidence against myself and iv, adverse inferences will be
dravv against me 1. f 1 1; v :^ testify
1 understand that 1 am
giving up these rights if 1 plead guilty.
1
1 knew that if 1 wis/i to contest t:'e charge against me I
need only plead "net guilty" and the matter W L I L b*3 set trir t.-i-.
£r the trial the State of Utah will have Lie l.urden :£ p r : v m g earn
f
element of the charge beycn.i 3 reasimat Le d'i"Lhr
"* tn^. r"" - J '
before a w r y the verdii"*1 rfin / h^- unanimous.

-49.

I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the

right of a presumption of innocence.
presumed

innocent until

I understand that I am

the State proves my

guilt

beyond a

reasonable doubt if this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead
guilty.

I understand that I give up the right to the presumption

of innocence if I plead guilty.
10.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were

tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have cne
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if I
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs
would be paid by the State.

I understand that I am giving up these

rights if I plead guilty.
11.

I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each

offense to which I plead guilty.

I know that by pleading guilty to

an offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory sentence
offense.

for that

I know that the sentence may be consecutive and may be

for a prison term, fine or both.

I know that in addition to a

fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed.

I

also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to
any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be
owed on charges that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this
plea agreement.
12.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods,

or the fine for an additional amount, if my plea is to more than
one charge.
awaiting

I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or

sentencing on another offense of which I have been

convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.

-5i'

' i«'row and understand

that by pleading

guilt.

i

waiving and giving up ;ny statutory and constitution. *! r::^taout m

one preceding paragraphs

r

?

, also Ln:w tha* by enter.r; 5.:;

plea. 5]

I am admitting and do so a tin, t thit I have committed the

conduct

allege:! an:i 1 am "in: If,1

" i- • -* rrimeis''

for wr.:ch iny

plea^s^is'are entered.
14,

My plea i :i i .! juii"/ iij

is n c ^ the result cf a plea

bargain between myself and f:he prosecuting attorney.

The promises,

duties ai;d provisions of" th 3 plpa bargain, if a:.j, aid

fully

contained * * this statement.
13

I !• ri">- a*d understand that if 1 desire t: witnora. ny

plea(S' or guilty and there is a legal basis to do so,

TII •

r ;,a

a motion within thirty ( jm days after-ia-ncgy of «iy"ybes>
16

I knew

recommendation

t'hat any

charge

u

sentencing-

of probation «JI suspended

concession

sentence,

or

including a

reduction of the cnarjes for jentencing made or sought by either
defense counsel, or tine prosecuting attorney are not. binding on tne
1 a Is: know tnat

Judge.

an/ opinions tney express to me a 5 *:: what

t"1*'/ believe the C-i|i:t may do are al.se not binding on tne Court.
1

"'

i threats, coercion, :r unlawful influence of any kind

have teen made to induce me t: plead .jutlty, and :r promises -- ,,:,n'"
those contained in this statement, have beer niaie t;; p".j
15,

1 have red \ this statement,

; I nave had it red! ' . ILT

by nr, attorney, and 1 understand its pri'/isuns.

I knew tn.3/ ' -\r

free to change or delete anything contained i.n this statement.
;r; not wish to make any c h a ^ e " yp-^n?- i I • f the statements are
correct.
19.
attorney.

- -if" i > '" i pi I i.

, i.e advice and assistance cf my

-620.
the

I am ^>Q>

years of age; I have attended school through

/(/> grade and I can read and understand the English language,

or an interpreter has been provided to me.

I was not under the

influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which would
impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s) .
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or
intoxicants which impair my judgment.
21.
mentally

I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind,
capable

of

understanding

the

proceedings

and

the

consequences of my plea, and free of any mental disease, defect cr
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my plea.
Dated this

T d a v of

Uese^bcr

EFEINMNT
DE

J

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
I c e r t i f y t h a t I am t h e a t t o r n e y for L)yn

(j^/"UJ

C*' I

,

the defendant above, and t h a t I know h e / s h e has r e a d t h e s t a t e m e n t
o r t h a t I have r e a d i t t o h i m / h e r and I have d i s c u s s e d i t with
h i m / h e r and b e l i e v e t h a t h e / s h e f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d s t h e meaning of
i t s c o n t e n t s and i s m e n t a l l y and p h y s i c a l l y competent. To t h e b e s t
of my knowledge and b e l i e f , a f t e r an a p p r o p r i a t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e
elements of t h e c r i m e ( s )
and t h e f a c t u a l s y n o p s i s of the
d e f e n d a n t ' s c r i m i n a l conduct a r e c o r r e c t l y s t a t e d and t h e s e , along
w i t h t h e o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and d e c l a r a t i o n s made by t h e
defendant i n t h e f o r e g o i n g a f f i d a v i t / a r e , a c c u r a t e and t r u e .

£25?
.TTORNEY' FOR DEFENDANT/BAR #

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I c e r t i f y t h a i I am the a t t a r ,
: a5 e against

/ i 2J^I_ ( r,fuu i t '

rsviewea

t n , 7, Statement

bas^s

i,. -J defendant

cffense

„
5

?f

,__ _

Tefendant

> 'rinmal

1 < t r u e ani c o r r e c t .

j t a - e nf

,
and

r

Jtah in t h e

i e f endant

t

find

tha:

nave

the

factual

conduct which c o n s t i t u t e s

No improper inducements,

the

tnreats

c : e i e r ' i i r c 11 j encourage a p l e a have been : f f e r e d defendant

The

p l e a n e g o t i a t i o n s are fully c o n t a i n e a in ti e Statement: a n i

, t ne

a t t a c h e d Plea Agreement cr a& supplemented :/

= trie

Court.

''.ere

is

reasonable

would s u p p o r t t a e o n v i c t l o n
which the p l e a t s ^

cause

tae r. e . : / d oef

l

t , ce. eve t a"; *""e

1? d e f e n i a n c

fir

rncence

trie c f f e n s e ( s

fir

I s ' a r e entered and trip a c c e p t a n c e of t h e p l e a . s

would s e r v e m e , ." ' '

> merest,
r

~

,; -

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY/BAR #
ORDER
Based on t h e f a c t s sat f o r t h in Lie foregoing Stateme:/ : I M
the c e r t i f i c a t i o n of the defendant and ;:ounsel f the Tcurt w i t n e s s e s
t h e s i g n a t u r e s and finds the d e f e n d a n t ' s n l e e i s i ot g u i l t
1 '
f r e e l y and vo i un t a r 1.1 y mad" ' 1,1 ;<: 11 ie re i t ha *' t ' e
1
defendant ' s p l e a 1 s c t g u i l t y
' ' « har/- ' - r • w f - rfc'• * n t/;«e
Statement be accepted and e n t e r e d .
/
Dated t h i s
,/;,
A^C^^C^—
, irjd

ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Addendum G

riLtD
:

Court of Appeals
• '

^no7

l

1U TUP! UTAH '".'i 'HPT )b Ai'PEAU

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

00O00
State of Utah,,
ORDER
J' 1 11 i l l J I !

rii 11 i A p p e I i e t - i ,

Case Nn

; ; o o ? 0 1 4 ^ -CA

o\v)o Sow

L i z a V i c t o r i a Co r w e 1 1 ,
De£ endai it: ai i> :i Appe 1 1 a n t .

This matter is before the court on Appellant's motions to
stay the appeal and temporarily remand the case to allow the
trial court to rule on Appellant's pending motion, to v/ithdraw her.
guilty plea.
ORDERED that this matter is temporarily
IT IS H E R E B Y
remanded to the Third District Court for a ruling on Appellant's
pending motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
If the trial court
denies the motion, Appellant shall file an amended notice of
appeal under the same appellate case number.
If the trial court:
grants the motion, Appellant shall "inform the court of any
circumstances which have transpired subsequent to the filing of
the appeal which render moot: one or more of the issues raised."'
Utah R. App, P, 3 7,
x. _ /J^IHER ORDERED that the appeal is stayed pending
disposition of the motion in the trial court.
^^t^iici)

1 1 1 1 'I

i«"uK THE I ' O U F T :

a
,
'<fft*r
• % 7„
' Ct
S r/

^ameT a T

jJ&

Greenwood,

ActuAiwd

Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 14th day of June, 2002, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand-delivered to a
personal representative of the Legal Defender's Office to be
delivered to:
PATRICK L. ANDERSON
KENT R. HART
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 E 500 S STE 300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was
hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney
General's Office to be delivered to:
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was placed in
Interdepartmental Mailing to be delivered to:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 18 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was placed in
Interdepartmental Mailing to be delivered to the judge listed
below:
HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860

By /yl/MUuf
Deputy Clerk

^Jlt^/cx^cL^X

J
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TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 011905094
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20020343-CA

Addendum H

IN THE THTP"

DISTRICT COURT,

' - ^ ^ A : ,

SALT LAKE COUNTi,

^A;(i

STATE CK

I'lAH

L A K L DEPARTMENT

•i l l l i )

Plaintir
1
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'C'A'ukl A CORWEI-T-
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Videotape Proceedings)
FILED DISTRICT COURT

)
i

Defendant.

*•__ - n iriUKAW

)

Third Judicial District

SFP ? 6 2002 •
-oOo-

%

^ALTUKE COUNTY

ZJJJJ^\U

Deputy Clerk

BE IT REMEMBERED that: on t h e 2 1 s t day cf -A.,--,
commencing a t MIP tmui >t ] ] : s l i
' fu
I '• "' 'dfiiui h e t o r e Lhe HONORABLE
TIMOTHY *
Cour*- f „.
I

" '" "V

«|

HANSON, s i t t i n q

a s .F'hlqe J i, the

.;ie p u r p o s e of thif^ c a u s e ,
i "'lA'x 11, i j i<> p i o - L ' e e d i n q s

were

above-named

ind th i•• Mi"
In-1 ,

-oOo' ''

A P p.. E_AJi^_..N c E u

LANA TAYLOR
Deputy Salt Laxu .Au
District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
:

PATRICK ; ANDERSON
Attorney .i t Law
Brown, Bradshaw Andersen &
Moffat
10 West Brc <i d * u
"
Salt Lake City.,* Utct;, 84101

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

ORIGINAL

1

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT L AKE CITY, UTAH 84107

J062d3<

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

No. 14, your Honor, Liza Corwell.

All right.

State of Utah vs. Liza

Corwell, it's Case No. 011905094.
I have for consideration today a motion to withdraw
plea filed by the defendant.

I've received the moving papers

and the responding papers, I've also received a remand from
the Court of Appeals remanding the matter back here for the
purpose of this hearing.
I have reviewed the plea colloquy transcript and
also the file with regard to the plea statement that Ms.
Corwell signed.
Now, are you ready to proceed?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

MR. ANDERSON:

Be glad to hear from you.

Your Honor, as we indicated before, I

feel that we've adequately set forth our position in the
memorandum and I believe Ms. Taylor is in agreement and we
would submit if the Court—unless the Court had any questions
from us.
THE COURT: Agree?
MS. TAYLOR:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, let's make sure the record's clear
here so the Court of Appeals knows what I'm doing.

2

The claims that the plea colloquy was defective was
tfta*
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ANDERSON
THE COURT:
i ii ider s t o o d ?

•-.

l 0 o v i 4 - *" u ^ p l e a

statement^

I did.

- •

i I MMII

•.
ANDERSON:

• • ;••
And—and she did, and--and I

3

:r

understand that.

And that—and I understand that that's Ms.

Taylor's position, that there was substantial compliance and
that the Court can look at those things.
I simply, in my motion, went through, your Honor,
and pointed out what had not been stated in the verbal
colloquy.
THE COURT:

And so, do you have any case law from

the Utah Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals that says the
entire—all the rights that need to be discussed under Rule 11
have to be orally stated?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

I do not, your Honor.

As a matter of fact, don't the cases

that started this whole discussion say that it can be oral and
written?
MR. ANDERSON:

It can be supplemented by written,

that's correct, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

Do you agree that the written

statement covers all the items you've talked about?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

Yes.

It does.

It—it doesn't say speedy trial. The

statement doesn't say speedy trial?
MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

It does not.

The record needs to show in this case, I

took this plea on a Friday and the trial was Monday.
MR. ANDERSON:

I understand that, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

Can't get much speedier than that.

MR. ANDERSON:
THE COURT:

I—I am aware of that.

Your client was aware that I — w e — w e

were going to trial on Monday, but she offered a plea?
MR. ANDERSON:

I believe from reviewing the record,

your Honor, you advised her of that fact.
THE COURT:

Uh huh.

Well, I don't think I missed

anything here and the fact that she didn't understand felony
versus misdemeanor is not something that's the subject of a
motion to withdraw the plea.
Unless there's something else, I'm—I find that
either through my oral colloquy with Ms. Corwell or—or and in
conjunction with the written statement that she said she'd
reviewed and understand, that her rights under Rule 11 were
all properly—properly explained to her.
A couple of these don't meet the criteria of being
harmful.

Even if I didn't tell her about the time limit for

filing her motion to withdraw the plea, which of course, the
statement does, she did and I'm hearing it, so obviously, that
doesn't—there's no harm there.
Consecutive sentences doesn't—that doesn't apply,
she only pled guilty to one crime here.

So, I don't see any

harm there, either,
So, in any event, for those reasons, the motion is
denied, the plea will stand and Ms. Corwell was advised.

5

So,

1
2
3

I decline to consider that.
I am going to now, as soon as I get an order—will
you send me an order, please, Ms. Turner?

4

MS. TURNER:

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. TURNER:

7
8
9

Yes.

Do you need findings?

Pardon me?
Do you need findings of fact and

conclusions of law with that?
THE COURT:

Well, I think so, yes.

The Court of

Appeals may want to revisit this matter.

10

MS. TURNER:

11

THE COURT:

Okay.
If they do, let's see if you have to say

12

all the words orally, if you do, things are going to change

13

around here radically; in other words, you'll all be here a

14

lot longer.

15

MR. ANDERSON:

Thank you very much, your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

17 I

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

All right.

18
19 |
20
21
22
23
24
25

* * *

Thank you.

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:
)

ss.

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received an electronically
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 6, inclusive, to the
best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise
interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of
September, 2002.

/

j

-Jpfic s*£t
Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day
of September, 2002.

03h "
Zr^s

oca
Notary

( S E A L )

7

REPORTERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of Utah,
do certify that I received an electronically recorded
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 6, inclusive, to the best of my knowledge,
constitute a full, true and correct transcription, except
where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings
were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise
interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 24th day Q f
September,. 20Q£±„

j

"<-^'

,;•

•

i

, Notary Public

( S E A L )
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Addendum I

FILED DISTRICT COURT

DAVID E YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No 7642
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801)363-7900

Third Judicial District

OCT 1 \ 2002

WM

Deputy C'erk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO VACATE CONVICTION
AND WITHDRAW PLEA

Plaintiff,

-v Case No 011905094

LIZA CORWELL,

Hon Timothy R Hanson

Defendant

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Conviction
and Withdraw Plea is denied
DATED this JJ_ day of Odtlkj<^

20j

BY THE coy&t,;.

5royed as to Form

'atnckL Anderson
Attorney for the Defendant

3

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
LANA TAYLOR, Bar No. 7642
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

CCT 1 1 2002
SALT LAKE COUNTY

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
I
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-v Case No. Oil905094
LIZA CORWELL,
Hon. Timothy R Hanson
Defendant.
This matter came on for a Motion to Vacate Conviction and Withdraw Plea
hearing on June 21, 2002, before the Court, the Honorable Timothy R Hanson, District
Court Judge, presiding. The State was represented by Deputy District Attorney Lana
Taylor. The Defendant was present and represented by Patrick L. Anderson. The Court,
based upon the arguments presented at the hearings, the memorandums of law submitted
by counsel, and for good cause shown, makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On December 7, 2001, a pretrial conference was held in the above-entitled

2.

The defendant was present and represented by counsel.

3.

The defendant reviewed and signed a plea form, prepared by her attorney,

matter.

which advised her of all of the rights she was giving up by entering a plea of guilty.

1

4

On the record, Judge Hanson reviewed most of those same rights with the

defendant
5.

Judge Hanson asked the defendant if she understood the rights he had

reviewed with her, which were contained in the plea form, and asked her if she was
willing to waive those rights, to which the defendant replied, "yes "
6

The defendant then pled guilty to the Third Degree Felony charge of

Attempted Tampering with Evidence
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The Judge substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 11 of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2

The defendant's plea to the felony charge of Attempted Tampering with

Evidence was made knowingly and voluntarily.
3

The conviction in this case was lawfully entered and there is no legal

reason why it should be vacated.
DATED this \j_ day of U(Tb(j<^

, 2002
BY^HECQU^T,r^

HSTRICT^JUDGE
Appptfecfts to Form:

Patrick f Anderson
Attorney for the Defendant

;
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Addendum J

Page 1
Not Reported in P 2d
2002 UTApp 124
(Cite as: 2002 WL 574333 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT RULES
BEFORE CITING

appeal from the unsigned minute entry In response to
this court's sua sponte motion, Culley has merely filed
copies of the original 1999 judgment and the unsigned
minute entry and has not demonstrated any basis for our
jurisdiction over the appeal.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v
Jamison Z CULLEY, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20010544 CA.
April 18,2002
John R Bucher, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Mark Shurtleffand Brett J. DelPorto, Salt Lake City,
for appellee.

Before BENCH, ORMh and THORNE, JJ
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)

It is well settled that an unsigned minute entry is not a
final appealable order and the appeal must be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction on that basis See, e g, State \
Rowlings. 829 P .2d 150, 153 (Utah CtApp.1992)
("[A]n unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment for
purposes of appeal"). In addition, Appellant did not file
a timely appeal from the underlying judgment entered
in this case on April 2, 1999, and Appellant's motion
did not toll the time for appeal under Rule 4(b) of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because it was
untimely as a motion for new trial under Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, entry
of a signed order denymg the motion will not revive an
appeal of the underlying judgment.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
it is not taken from a final appealable judgment and
because it is untimely if construed to be an appeal from
the underlying judgment.

PER CURIAM

2002 WL 574333 (Utah App.), 2002 UT App 124

*1 This case is before the court on a sua sponte motion
for summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

END OF DOCUMENT

The district court entered its Sentence, Judgment, and
Commitment on April 2, 1999 On June 7, 2001,
Appellant filed a "Motion for Entry of Misplea and
Motion to Correct A Sentence That Was Imposed In An
Illegal Manner Pursuant to Rule 22(e) Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure" m which he sought a new trial or
a declaration of a misplea. The district court correctly
construed the motion as a motion for new trial or
motion to withdraw guilty plea based upon the relief
requested A motion under rule 22(e) presumes a valid
conviction and challenges only an allegedly illegal
sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner
See State \> Brooks 908 P 2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995) ("A
request to correct an illegal sentence under rule 22(e)
presupposes a valid conviction."). The motion in this
case challenged the validity of Appellant's guilty plea
and resulting conviction, not the validity of the sentence
alone.
The district court denied the motion for new
trial/motion to withdraw guilty plea as untimely in an
unsigned minute entry. Appellant filed a notice of
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig U S. Govt. Works

Addendum K

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury
trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence,
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
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H i the defendant has been adwsed of the time limits for filing an>
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
make a motion under Section 77-13-6
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court.
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea,
^^^rjjgjrjgj^gflj^^
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, redesignated
former Subdivisions (a) through (d) and (f) as
present Subdivisions (1) through (4) and (8),
respectively, and former Subdivision (e) as
Subdivisions (5) and (7), divided Subdivision
(1) into two sentences, substituting "The defendant may" for "and shall" at the beginning of
the present second sentence; substituted "may"
for "shall" m the introductory language of Subdivision (5), added "and" to the end of Subdivision (5)(f) and added Subdivision (5)(g); added
Subdivision (6); substituted "may" for "shall"
in Subdivision (8)(a); and made minor stylistic
changes throughout the rule.
The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993,
revised the subdivision designations, substituting letters for numbers and vice versa, inserted

"or guilty and mentally ill" in the introductory
paragraph in Subdivision (e) and in Subdivision (f), rewrote Subdivision (e)(3) to list more
rights; inserted "and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence" in Subdivision (e)(5), added Subdivision
(e)(8), deleted "that contemplates entry of a
plea in the expectation that other charges will
be dropped or dismissed" after "has been
reached" in Subdivision (h)(2), added Subdivision d); and made stylistic changes throughout
the rule
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of
pleas, plea discussions or related statements,
Rule 410, U R E
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6

